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1 Introduction 
1.1 Topic and background 
The topic of this thesis is to identify shipowner1 risks arising from ‘Conditions of Use’ 
(CoU) at gas terminals and subsequently discuss possible insurance and charter party 
coverage of such risks.  
 
CoU are standardised contracts issued by the port to the shipowner, allocating risks arising 
during the vessel’s port call. Many incidents may occur in relation to port calls, giving rise 
to a number of risks. Most ports require compulsory pilotage and tugs, and collision or 
striking may occur either between vessel and tug or between vessel and berth or other 
vessels. Furthermore, there may be accidents related to mooring, pollution, cargo 
operations and treatment of explosive substances, the latter of which is particularly relevant 
in the oil and gas trade.  
 
The contracts are characterised by far-reaching liability provisions which often work to the 
effect that the shipowner becomes unlimitedly liable for all and any damage both to its own 
and the terminal’s interests as well as third party liabilities. The ordinary shipowner 
insurances do not cover liability which is more onerous than what follows from ordinary 
law, and this creates the need for additional insurance and charter party cover. 
 
Since Norway has a world-leading position within carriage of natural gas, the CoU are 
frequently encountered by Norwegian vessels. Norway is the fifth largest shipping nation in 
the world, and holds significant market shares within carriage of oil, gas and chemical as 
                                                 
1 The term ‘shipowner’ is used throughout this thesis instead of the wider Norwegian term ‘reder’. In the 
context of international contracts, it seems justifiable and appropriate. For the legal distinction between the 
two terms, cf. Falkanger/Bull/Brautaset: Scandinavian Maritime Law – The Norwegian Perspective 2nd 
edition (2004) pp. 139 et seq. 
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well as offshore services.2 The petroleum industry contributes approximately one fourth of 
Norway’s total value added.3  
 
In an effort of dialogue between shipowners and terminals, Norwegian shipowners have 
tried to raise the issue of the CoU in SIGTTO4, but due to its non-technical nature, the 
topic was deemed to be outside the scope of the society’s work. Notably, there is a clash of 
interest in SIGTTO, since both sides of the table are represented there.  
 
On the other hand, gas charterers have a stronger negotiating position than shipowners due 
to the fact that the charterers are usually large international petroleum companies with a 
frequent ownership interest in the terminals. The charterers have proven successful e.g. in 
Ras Laffan5, where the conditions have been amended and subsequently approved by the 
P&I insurers. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
1.2 The outline of the thesis 
In order to facilitate an examination of this topic, the contracts will first be placed in a 
legal, practical, geographical and historical context.  
 
Section 2 outlines the legal framework with contractual freedom, relevant background law 
and jurisprudence.  
 
Section 3 provides the practical and geographical context with a description of the gas 
industry and markets.  
 
Section 4 outlines characteristic features, historical background, similar practices and the 
contents of the contracts. 
                                                 
2 Norwegian Shipowners’ Association: Norsk skipsfart (URL: www.rederi.no/default.asp?V_ITEM_ID=501)  
3 Statistics Norway: Naturressurser og miljø (URL: www.ssb.no/vis/magasinet/miljo/art-2007-01-24-01.html)  
4 The Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (URL: http://sigtto.re-invent.net/DNN)  
5 Examined CoU are enclosed as an annex. Cf. page A at the back for an alphabetical list.  
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 Section 5 discusses certain issues related to contract formation, more specifically the 
contract’s binding effect and application with and without the master’s signature.  
 
Section 6 firstly contains a detailed discussion of the liability provisions with a view to 
examining their legal consequences for the shipowner and subsequently discusses whether 
such terms may be set aside or adjusted under Norwegian law. 
 
Section 7 discusses insurance coverage and risk allocation between shipowner and 
charterer. Problems in relation to P&I6 insurance and hull insurance are examined 
separately, and the presentation also includes a suggested charter party provision drawn up 
by Nordisk Defence Club7 (Nordisk).  
 
The final section summarises the main points of the thesis with an emphasis on how the 
contracts may be adjusted to obtain insurance cover.  
2 Legal sources 
2.1 Contractual freedom and relevant background law 
Four different contracts are involved during a gas carrier’s port call: i) the underlying sales 
contract, ii) the terminal’s CoU, iii) the charter party and iv) the insurance contract(s). 
 
With respect to i), it is sufficient to note that the gas charterer is also often the buyer of the 
cargo and has signed long-term charter agreements with independent carriers.  
 
                                                 
6 Protection and Indemnity, cf. 7.2 below 
7 A mutual freight, demurrage and defence club which also acts as a maritime law firm for its members and 
other clients. Nordisk’s main office is in Oslo, Norway (URL: www.nordisk.org)  
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With respect to ii), the majority of the CoU stipulate local choice of law and jurisdiction 
and the remaining stipulate English law and courts. Considering the various terminal 
contracts on the basis of their local jurisdictions is outside the scope of this thesis. Thus, 
Norwegian law will be used as the legal framework.  
 
The Formation of Contracts Act of 31 May 1918 (No. 4) is the basis for Norwegian 
contract law. § 1 establishes the principle of contractual freedom, which gives the parties 
the freedom to decide on the contents of the contract. Nevertheless, § 36 of this act 
provides the courts with a discretionary measure for adjusting or setting aside contracts if 
the contractual freedom has been misused.   
 
The main legal source of maritime law is the Norwegian Maritime Code (NMC) of 24 June 
1994 (No. 39). CoU are not regulated in this statute, and thus there are not specific 
requirements to contents, making the Formation of Contracts Act § 36 the legal basis for 
setting aside or adjusting such terms. 
 
There will also be references to English law, particularly in the discussions of the contract’s 
binding effect and whether such contracts constitute general trade practice. 
 
With respect to iii), NMC § 322 establishes freedom of contract in the charter party trade 
unless the trade is domestic, where certain restrictions apply. There is a widespread use of 
standard forms in the charter party trade, and these forms are often biased either in favour 
of the shipowner or the charterer. In the LNG trade the form ShellLNGTime1 is frequently 
used. 
 
With respect to iv), the Insurance Contracts Act of 16 June 1989 (No. 69) is compulsory for 
Norwegian insurance contracts, but § 1-3 second subparagraph letter c) stipulates that it is 
supplementary for shipowner insurances. The contractual freedom in this area stems from 
the extent of professionalism dominating the trade, its international character as well as a 
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particular legislative technique where represented interests together have drafted the 
insurance conditions.8  
 
In relation to the CoU, two different types of insurance are relevant, namely hull and P&I 
insurance, and these two are regulated by different conditions.  
 
Hull insurance is regulated under the Norwegian Marine Insurance Plan 1996 version 2007 
(NMIP). The NMIP regulates most aspects of marine insurance and has extensive 
commentaries which are to be regarded as part of the conditions.9 Although the NMIP is 
not binding and insurance may thus be effected on other conditions, it is in widespread use 
among Norwegian shipowners, and for the purpose of this thesis hull insurance will be 
discussed on the basis of the NMIP.  
 
The main legal source for P&I insurance is the private conditions issued by the mutual P&I 
societies. For the purpose of this thesis, reference will be made to Gard10 Statutes and 
Rules 2008 (GR).  
                                                
 
2.2 Case law 
Case law is an important source for interpretation of contractual provisions, but so far there 
are no Scandinavian decisions on Conditions of Use. However, some aspects of concern for 
this thesis have been discussed in English case law.  
 
Moreover, reference will be made to Scandinavian case law in the discussions of whether 
the contracts apply without the master’s signature and whether such liability provisions 
may be set aside or adjusted by a Norwegian court.  
 
 
8 Wilhelmsen/Bull: Handbook in hull insurance (2007), pp. 27 – 28  
9 Wilhelmsen/Bull, p. 29 cf. the Commentary to NMIP § 1-4 
10 The world’s second largest P&I club (URL: www.gard.no) 
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2.3 Legal literature 
Legal literature, although not a source of law in the strictest sense, is useful for finding 
arguments either for or against a position, and the arguments are particularly relevant if 
written by a person of authority in the field. The literature also gives a systematic 
presentation and review of the relevant legal sources.  
 
Relevant literature will be discussed and cited where appropriate.  
3 The gas industry 
3.1 Gas processing and transportation 
Natural gases are extracted from underground gas fields through wells in a gaseous state.11 
Before sea carriage can take place, the gases must be refined and liquefied at processing 
plants. The gaseous mixture consists of approximately 82 per cent methane, which is 
merchandised as ‘natural gas’ (LNG12) and 18 percent is a blend of ethane, nitrogen, 
propane, carbon dioxide, butane and pentane in decreasing order.13 Before LNG can be 
transported and utilised, the petroleum gases, which are slightly heavier than methane, must 
be extracted. When LNG has been refined, it consists of approximately 95 per cent 
methane and 5 per cent other substances. 
 
The liquefied petroleum gases, LPG, are mainly propane and butane and are natural 
derivatives from the refining of either LNG or crude oil. Gas processing is the source of 
approximately 60 per cent of produced petroleum gases, and crude oil refining constitutes 
the origin of the remaining 40 per cent. 
                                                 
11 Younger, A. H.: ‘Natural gas – processing principles and technology’, lecture (URL: 
www.ucalgary.ca/ENCH/class_notes/ench607/mainmenu.pdf)  
12 Liquefied natural gas 
13 University of Texas, Bureau of Economic Geology: Introduction to LNG (URL: 
www.beg.utexas.edu/energyecon/lng/documents/CEE_INTRODUCTION_TO_LNG_FINAL.pdf)  
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 Pipeline transportation is increasing its market share, but sea carriage is still the most 
common means of transportation due to lower costs. Pre-liquefied gas is led via terminals 
into large gas carriers through loading arms connected to the vessel’s piping system.  
 
During transportation, the gas is kept at boiling point by removing the vaporised gas from 
the tanks and either running it through a reliquefaction plant and returning it to the tanks 
(typical on LPG carriers), or channelling the vapour into the vessel’s boilers, thus utilising 
it for main propulsion (typical on LNG carriers). The boiling point of LNG at ambient 
pressure is -160ºC. Such low temperatures require special design materials and safety 
measures.  
 
The gas trade is predominantly a charter party trade, characterised by long-term charter 
parties. The LNG trade may be compared with liner shipping with its 20-year long charter 
parties and a few regular ports. 
 
3.2 The LNG market 
Hydrocarbon gases are used for generating electricity and as raw material for fibres, 
clothing, plastic, health care, computing and furnishing. In the USA these gases are also 
utilised in private households for cooking and heating.14  
 
The LNG shipping market is continuously expanding, with 275 tankers in operation and 
102 on order as of August 2008.15 
 
Worldwide, there are 26 existing export or liquefaction terminals, located on or off shore, 
in 15 countries.16 Contrastingly, there are 60 existing import or regasification terminals, on 
                                                 
14 University of Texas, Bureau of Economic Geology: Introduction to LNG  
15 Shipbuilding history: The order book of LNG carriers (URL: 
www.shipbuildinghistory.com/world/highvalueships/lngorderbook.htm)   
16 The California Energy Commission: LNG international (URL: www.energy.ca.gov/lng/international.html)  
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or off shore, in 18 countries. In addition to these existing terminals, there are approximately 
65 liquefaction terminal projects and approximately 181 regasification terminal projects, 
either proposed or under construction all around the world, although it is not expected that 
all proposed terminals will be constructed. 
 
The following nations export LNG (start-up year in parenthesis): 
 
Algeria (1971)  
Australia (1989)  
Brunei (1972)  
Equatorial Guinea (2007)  
Egypt (2004)  
Indonesia (1977)  
Libya (1970)  
Malaysia (1983)  
Nigeria (1999)  
Norway (2007)  
Oman (2000)  
Qatar) (1997)  
Trinidad and Tobago (1999)  
United Arab Emirates (1977)  
United States of America (1969) 
 
The following nations import LNG: 
 
Belgium (1987)  
China, People's Republic of (2006)  
Dominican Republic (2003)  
France (1972)  
Greece (2000)  
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India (2004)  
Italy (1971)  
Japan (1969)  
Mexico (2006)  
Portugal (2003)  
Puerto Rico (U.S. outlying territory) (2000)  
South Korea (1986)  
Spain (1969)  
Taiwan (Republic of China) (1990)  
Turkey (1992)  
United Kingdom (2005)  
United States of America (1971) 
 
Experts predict that by 2030 natural gas will be meeting 25 per cent of global energy 
needs.17 Obviously, this places the export ports in an increasingly strong negotiating 
position with respect to the Conditions of Use. 
4 An outline of the Conditions of Use 
This section outlines the characteristic features and historical background of the CoU and 
provides an overview of their contents.  
 
4.1 Characteristic features 
Conditions of Use in gas carriage are standardised contracts for use of LNG and LPG ports. 
Such conditions are mainly found at export terminals in Africa, the Middle East, Indonesia 
and Mexico. 
                                                 
17 Ahsan, Muhammad Farooque: LNG re-enters the world energy market, Pipeline and Gas Journal (URL: 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3251/is_11_233/ai_n24996339?tag=artBody;col1)  
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 These contracts often imply unlimited and strict, or far-reaching, liability for the shipowner 
and entail wide disclaimers on behalf of the terminal, thus resulting in a channelling of all 
liability under the contract to the shipowner. Moreover, the contracts are so general and 
comprehensive in their form that it is difficult to quantify the extent of exposure. 
Furthermore, the requirement for causation is limited or non-existent, and the fact that the 
contracts are often subject to local law, implying a wide range of exotic laws, makes this 
risk more difficult to determine.  
 
A descriptive comment about the Conditions of Use is found in the English Court of First 
Instance decision The Polyduke,18 concerning berth damage covered by an indemnity 
provision used by an oil terminal.  
 
‘[A] common pattern of these conditions is to purport to cast upon the shipowner an 
extremely wide measure of risks and liabilities. Although the documents vary in their 
form and content, their general effect is to seek to cast upon the shipowners all risks 
of loss and damage to the vessel or to their owners, and all liability for loss or 
damage to the installations and to their owners or occupiers which might arise in 
connection with the vessel’s user [sic] of the terminal, howsoever such loss or 
damage might be caused, and even if the cause might be some negligence or default 
on the part of the owners or occupiers of the terminal.’ 19 
 
4.2 Background and similar practices 
It is likely that Conditions of Use found their way into the gas trade from the oil trade. The 
Polyduke decision contains a statement to the effect that CoU were employed by oil 
terminals already in the 1950s.20  
                                                 
18 [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 2-11 (Bahamas Oil Refining Co. vs. Kristiansands Tankrederi A/S and Others and 
Shell International Marine Ltd.), Kerr J presiding 
19 p. 214 
20 p. 214 
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 The decision also states that the employment of such contracts in the oil trade ‘follows that 
of a number of widely used and somewhat notorious conditions in other fields concerning 
shipping.’21 
 
Equally imbalanced conditions are found in contracts regulating pilotage and tug hire. Tug 
contracts are standardised contracts which protect the tug company from liability to a 
significant extent and impose a considerable degree of liability on the shipowner for 
damage caused to the tug company.22 The shipowner may also be forced to accept 
contractual collision liability and waiver of the right to claim damages in so-called ‘Let 
Pass Agreements’ or ‘Port conditions’ in order to use a canal or waterway to enter a port.23  
 
Nevertheless, according to the court in The Polyduke case, ‘whereas the shipowners and 
their insurers have come to accept similar conditions in relation to tug contracts, perhaps 
because they are so widespread and do not give rise to risks of the same magnitude, there 
has been a considerable measure of resistance to the unqualified acceptance of such 
conditions when sought to be imposed by oil terminals,’ quoting as reason that the P&I 
insurance ‘cover will not extend to liabilities arising under contractual indemnities […] 
unless their terms have previously been approved’ by the insurers.24  
 
This has led to the development of side letters in the oil trade, whereby the P&I insurers 
have made the terminals agree not to rely on the terms of the indemnity clauses if the loss 
is resulting from negligence or default on the part of the terminal.25 However, side letters 
are not so common in the gas trade.  
 
                                                 
21 p. 214 
22 Falkanger/Bull/Brautaset, p. 156 
23 Wilhelmsen/Bull, p. 287 
24 p. 214 
25 p. 214 
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4.3 Contractual contents 
The Conditions of Use may differ in structure, but the contents are very similar. 
 
Firstly, there is an indemnity provision implying strict liability for the shipowner arising 
out of any loss or damage to the terminal facilities or injury or death of any person 
employed there. In the majority of the contracts, this provision expressly states that liability 
applies regardless of any negligence or default by the vessel, shipowner or its servants.26 
 
Secondly, the contracts normally include an indemnity provision stipulating that the 
shipowner must hold the terminal harmless from any claim by third parties.  
 
Thirdly, the terminal disclaims all liability for any loss, damage or delay on the part of the 
shipowner arising from the use of the terminal, even where it is due to the terminal’s own 
fault. 
 
Fourthly, there is a warranty disclaimer for the safety and suitability of the port. There is 
also normally a separate disclaimer related to losses caused by pilots, tugs and other 
navigational services. 
 
Fifthly, the contracts often include a warranty by the shipowner for the suitability and 
capability of the vessel.  
 
Sixthly, the majority of the conditions include provisions granting the terminal the right to 
remove any sunken or grounded vessel, placing all expenses incurred thereby with the 
shipowner. 
 
Seventhly, the contracts often require indemnification for pollution or discharge.  
                                                 
26 The shipowner’s servants include inter alia the master, crew and agent, and the terminal’s servants include 
inter alia mooring and cargo personnel. The position of pilots and tug crew is unclear, as they may be 
regarded as either the shipowner’s or terminal’s servants under the contract, cf. 6.3.1 below.  
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 Finally, several contracts stipulate that the vessel may be detained until sufficient security 
can be posted.27 This may lead to offhire losses for the shipowner.  
5 Contract formation  
This section discusses certain issues related to contract formation, more specifically the 
contracts’ binding effect and application with and without the master’s signature.  
 
Under Norwegian law the legal basis for contract formation is found in the Formation of 
Contracts Act Chapter 1. This statute draws on common Scandinavian principles of 
contract formation, and the starting point is freedom of contract, cf. § 1. In commercial 
contracts this freedom is frequently used to agree on separate terms for creating a legally 
binding agreement.28 
 
CoU are not agreed documents, but should rather be regarded as a type of standard form 
contracts, which are often used to impose liability exclusions which have not been 
negotiated.29 Although legislation has been adapted to protect consumers from 
unreasonable contract terms,30 this does not apply to the shipowner since contracting 
parties in shipping are traditionally regarded as equal commercial parties, bargaining freely 
to reach an optimal result.31 However, in this case neither negotiations nor rejection is 
available.  
 
The contractual relationship between shipowner and terminal is formed via the master 
when the vessel enters the port. During the initial phase of the port call the local authorities 
                                                 
27 Sharjah Clause 2 and ‘Conditions binding upon all users of Port Rashid Dubai’ Clause c) 
28 Woxholth: Avtalerett, 6th edition (2006), p. 149 
29 Poole: Textbook on contract law 8th edition (2006) 
30 The Norwegian Marketing Act of 16 June 1972 (No. 47) § 9 a. 
31 Rt. 1948.370 NSC is authority to the fact that the freedom of contract is almost unlimited in professional 
relationships, particularly with respect to standard contracts 
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will present the master with the contract for signing and stamping. The master’s signature 
is compulsory, and there is no room for negotiations. Unless the master signs he will not be 
allowed to berth, and it is not an option to go to another port.  
 
Several CoU also expressly apply regardless of the master’s signature.32  
 
5.1 The contract’s binding effect - the English position 
CoU have never been discussed by a Norwegian court, but their binding effect has been 
considered under English law. 
 
The owner of The Polyduke contended that the contract’s indemnity clause was not 
binding, using the following arguments:  
 
1) the clause had no contractual effect at all because  
a) the provision, being extremely wide and wholly unreasonable, required special 
notification 
b) the word ‘Received’ above the master’s signature did not imply assent 
c) the document was not a contract, but rather an administrative paper33 
 
2) or if the contract did have legal effect, it was not binding because the master had no 
authority to sign the document.34  
 
The court held that the wording of the contract proved that it was clearly intended to have 
legal effect.35 In the absence of any evidence by the master that he had sought to displace 
the contractual effect of his signature or that he had not understood the contractual terms, 
the court had to assume that the contract was entered into intentionally. In any case, any 
                                                 
32 Cf. 5.3 below 
33 p. 215 
34 Cf. 5.2 below 
35 p. 215 
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lack of understanding or intention on the part of the master would have failed as a legal 
argument. This was not a ‘ticket’ case, where some document, like a receipt, was merely 
handed over and thus required prior or special notice. Under English law, in the absence of 
fraud or misrepresentation, a signature binds and signifies knowledge and assent.  
 
A corresponding dispute under Norwegian law would have be treated as a question of 
setting aside or adjusting an already existing contract under the Formation of Contracts Act 
§ 36, where formation is one of several elements of censorship.36 However, as long as the 
contract is signed by the master within his scope of authority, it is not likely that the word 
‘received’ would influence the binding effect of his signature.  
 
5.2 The master’s authority to enter into contracts 
Questions of validity may also arise in relation to the master’s authority to enter into 
contracts on behalf of the shipowner, particularly if he accepts extra burdensome 
conditions.  
 
Under Norwegian law, the provisions pertaining to the master’s authority are found in 
NMC Chapter 6. § 137 gives the master far-reaching authority to enter into contracts on 
behalf of the shipowner, including towage contracts.37 Moreover, the master may conclude 
contracts relating to ‘the performance of the voyage and to make agreements for the 
carriage of goods on the voyage’. CoU are agreements that need to be entered into in order 
to be allowed to berth, and should thus be considered as necessary both for the performance 
of the voyage and the carriage of goods. Thus, the master has authority to bind the 
shipowner when signing the CoU. The master himself, however, is not bound, cf. § 139.  
 
The English position on the master’s authority to bind the shipowner is made clear by The 
Polyduke decision.38 The shipowner contended that the contract was not binding because 
                                                 
36 Cf. 6.4 below 
37 Falkanger/Bull/Brautaset, p. 235 
38 Cf. 5.1 above 
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the master had not had the authority to accept such extra burdensome conditions on its 
behalf. However, based on the evidence the court held that i) in the tanker trade there is a 
general practice of masters being required to sign such CoU, thus giving the master implied 
and ostensible authority to do so, and ii) such documents are generally regarded as liable to 
have contractual effect.39  
 
The evidence also showed that it was left to the discretion of the master to conclude 
contracts on behalf of the shipowner, providing the master with the express authority to do 
so. The evidence also showed that the CoU were of a class which it was customary to sign, 
and the master’s orders were to berth at the terminal, which he could not have done without 
signing this document, providing him with implied authority.40 Moreover, no action had 
been taken against this master for having signed such contracts, neither on this occasion nor 
any other.41  
 
The fact that there is a general practice for masters to sign such documents, also supports 
the master’s authority under the NMC § 137.  
 
5.3 Application without the master’s signature 
Many contracts contain provisions to ensure application even in the absence of the master’s 
signature: ‘[T]he following shall be deemed to have been specifically accepted by any 
vessel visiting the port regardless of whether such acceptance is specific, in writing or 
otherwise.’42  
 
                                                 
39 p. 215 
40 p. 216 
41 p. 216 
42 Hazira Clause 2. 1st subparagraph, last sentence 
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Another example: ‘Use of the Terminal (including use of services) shall constitute 
acceptance by the Owners of the Conditions of Use […] regardless of whether the Master 
has executed the Master’s Acknowledgement.’ 43 
 
Thus, the contracts apply even if not signed, as they shall be deemed to have been 
specifically accepted by any visiting vessel.  
 
A parallel may be drawn to parking conditions under Scandinavian law, where the rationale 
is that when a driver parks his car, he is complying with the expectation from the owner of 
the premises that an agreement for remuneration has been formed. Both a Swedish 
Supreme Court decision44 and a Norwegian Court of Appeal decision45 constitute authority 
that a binding agreement is being formed by the act of parking the car without the need for 
a signature. By analogy, the master’s ‘parking’ of the vessel may be regarded to eliminate 
the need for his signature.  
 
The CoU may also be compared to standard terms, which are customarily introduced by a 
party in addition to the signed contract. The Formation of Contracts Act is silent upon the 
subject of standard terms, but case law gives guidelines concerning the terms of 
acceptance.46 The main rule with respect to standard terms is that in order to apply, they 
must have been brought to the other party’s attention before signing,47 which is the case for 
the CoU.  
 
Such contracts may also have been pre-approved as part of the charter party. There are 
examples that long-term charter parties concerning carriage from specific terminals 
                                                 
43 Punta Europa Clause 2.6 2nd subparagraph 
44 NJA 1981.323 SSC 
45 RG 1991.736 NCA 
46 Woxholth, p. 192 
47 Woxholth, p. 192 
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implement the conditions as an addendum to the charter party stating that they have been 
accepted by the shipowner.48  
6 The liability provisions – indemnities and disclaimers  
6.1 Two approaches: Indemnification and disclaimer clauses 
The focus of this thesis is on the liability provisions of the contracts, although several of the 
CoU also include technical guidelines and procedures for use of the terminal. This section 
will discuss the main principles of allocation of liability in the CoU with a comparative 
view to differences and similarities between the contracts. 
 
The liability provisions are structured in two different ways, either as indemnity or 
disclaimer clauses. Indemnification renders a party harmless from expenses that would 
otherwise have fallen on it, whereas a disclaimer clause disclaims liabilities that would 
otherwise have attached to the disclaiming party. Consequently, if a clause indemnifies a 
party from a liability, this indemnity clause operates as a disclaimer for that party. A far-
reaching indemnity clause removes the need for a disclaimer because it is sufficient for the 
indemnified party to require indemnification from damages and losses to its own interests 
and from expenses imposed by others as well as from liabilities towards the contractual 
partner and third parties. As a result, indemnity and disclaimer clauses sometimes overlap 
and different contracts may use either an indemnity or a disclaimer clause to allocate the 
very same liability.  
 
Usually, the indemnity clauses regulate the shipowner’s liability for terminal interests and 
the disclaimers regulate the terminal’s disclaiming of liability for shipowner interests. 
Third party liabilities may be allocated either as indemnities or disclaimers. However, the 
                                                 
48 Rygh (Nordisk Defence Club): Terminalvilkår “Conditions of Use”, lecture at a meeting in CMI Norway 
(31 March 2008) 
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indemnity and disclaimer clauses produce the joint effect that all liability rests with the 
shipowner. However, despite this difference in structure, the allocation of liability is 
generally the same in all the CoU. 
 
In traditional contractual relationships allocation of risk is based on compensation for 
damages. There must be a causal link between the damaging incident and the ensuing loss, 
and if there is no such link, the loss will lie where it falls.49  
 
The CoU, however, are based on the concept of an economic allocation of risk 
independently of the principle of liability in negligence. The risk allocation of such 
contracts implies a marked departure from what is usual in the background law. Under such 
an allocation of risk model, commonly used in petroleum contracts,50 the procedure is to 
allocate the losses not only of the contractual parties but also of third parties.51 As regards 
the latter, the contractual parties may not reduce a third party’s rights, but may freely 
regulate recourse and indemnity provisions.52 Thus, the risk allocation in the CoU in 
principle covers all losses arising from the contract. 
 
Under an allocation of risk model a central point is that risk allocated to one of the parties 
lies there regardless of fault. This may cause more liability to lie with one party than what 
follows from background law.53 Furthermore, the far-reaching disclaimer clauses for 
damage to the other party’s property results in less liability than what would otherwise 
have been imposed on it.54  
 
A model where all risk has been allocated to one of the parties has been called the 
unilateral strict liability model.55 Under this model one contractual party must bear all 
                                                 
49 Bull: Tredjemannsdekninger i forsikringsforhold (1988), p. 337 
50 Bull, p. 337  
51 Bull, p. 338 
52 Bull, p. 339 
53 Bull, p. 353 
54 Bull, p. 346 
55 Bull, p. 357 
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losses to its own interests as well as to the other party’s interests regardless of cause, 
provided that the losses may in any way be related to activities under the contract. Hence, 
such contracts imply strict liability regardless of fault. The CoU follow the principles of the 
unilateral strict liability model.  
 
In this section a distinguishing line will be drawn between the shipowner’s liability for 
terminal interests on the one hand (6.2) and the terminal’s disclaiming of liability for 
shipowner interests on the other hand (6.3). The last subsection will discuss whether such 
provisions may be set aside or adjusted under Norwegian law (6.4). 
 
6.2 The shipowner’s liability for terminal/port interests 
Under Norwegian law the starting point for establishing liability is i) basis of liability, ii) 
causation and iii) economic loss. Liability may be based in statute, contract or tort and is 
either strict or in negligence.  
 
The traditional approach under Norwegian law is that liability for damages is triggered by 
negligence.56 Liability in negligence is liability for loss or damage caused by a negligent or 
unjustifiable act or omission, whereas strict liability arises without fault.57 
 
In contracts, liability in negligence is sometimes replaced by liability in negligence with a 
reversed burden of proof. The latter lies between strict liability and negligence-based 
liability,58 since a reversed burden of proof may be impossible to lift, thus rendering a 
person liable without fault.59  
 
                                                 
56 Falkanger/Bull/Brautaset, p. 161 
57 Lødrup: Lærebok i erstatningsrett 5th edition (2006), p. 35 
58 Lødrup, p. 35 
59 Falkanger/Bull/Brautaset, p. 163 
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Moreover, a person is also vicariously liable for the faults of its employees and 
contractors60 under Norwegian law.61 Vicarious liability is a form of strict liability in the 
sense that the liable person itself has not been negligent.62 However, the person is only 
liable if the fault is such that the servant would have been personally liable.63  
 
In maritime law vicarious liability is contained in NMC § 151, which stipulates that the 
shipowner is liable for ‘the fault or neglect of the master, crew, pilot, tug or others 
performing work in the service of the ship.’ It follows from this definition that the vicarious 
liability encompasses both regular employees, self-employed personnel and sometimes 
even other people’s employees, like pilots and tugs, as long as they are performing work in 
the service of the ship.64 There is some disagreement concerning whether § 151 includes 
contractual liability, but this issue is less practical since there is general consensus that 
contractual liability extends at least as far as the tort liability under § 151.65 
 
This subchapter will discuss the practical solutions in the contracts with respect to the 
shipowner’s liability for terminal/port interests. 6.2.1 will present the parties liable under 
the contracts, 6.2.2 will examine the basis of liability including vicarious liability, 6.2.3 
will discuss causation, 6.2.4 will present indemnified parties and losses covered and 6.2.5 
will examine possible limitations of the shipowner’s liability.  
 
6.2.1 Liable parties 
The shipowner is always liable for the terminal’s losses.66 Furthermore, some contracts 
stipulate direct liability for other parties in addition.  
 
                                                 
60 A ‘contractor’ is a person or a company that contracts to supply materials or labour and thus becomes a 
self-employed servant of the contractee. 
61 Cf. Torts Act of 13 June 1969 (No. 26) § 2-1 and ordinary background law 
62 Falkanger/Bull/Brautaset, p. 163 
63 Falkanger/Bull/Brautaset, p. 163 
64 Falkanger/Bull/Brautaset, p. 174 
65 Falkanger/Bull/Brautaset, pp. 175 – 176  
66 Inter alia Punta Europa Clause 2.1 (a) 
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The Kuwait Conditions contain the widest scope of liable parties: The vessel or its owners, 
charterers, managers or operators are liable for terminal damage, whereas the same entities 
are jointly and severally liable for third party damage.67 It is not clear whether this 
distinction is intentional.  
 
This raises the question of whether joint and several liability should be read into the 
contract where not specified. The starting point under Norwegian tort law is that where 
there is more than one tortfeasor, there is joint and several liability.68 Thus, where there are 
several liable parties, joint and several liability should be assumed.  
 
The majority of the contracts stipulate that the vessel and the shipowner shall hold the 
terminal harmless.69 Under Norwegian law, the starting point is that if a vessel is held 
liable, the shipowner is held liable since the vessel is identified with its owner. However, if 
the shipowner has outsourced a broad range of management functions, liabilities incurred 
by the ship will be channelled to the manager.70 
 
The Ras Laffan and Sharjah Conditions stipulate joint and several liability between master 
and shipowner,71 and Port Rashid defines the liable party as inter alia ‘any person, vessel’72 
which may implicate anyone on board ship as well as the shipowner. Direct action against 
the master and other crew members is possible under ordinary law, but is less practical due 
to limited possibilities of full recovery.  
 
                                                 
67 Clause 4 
68 Torts Act § 5-3 
69 Qalhat Clause 1c), Escravos Clause 5, Bonny Clause 5.1 4th subparagraph, Altamira Clause 5, Braefoot Bay 
Section A (a) (ii), Abu Dhabi Clause 4 and Kharg Clause 4 
70 Falkanger/Bull/Brautaset, p. 141, cf. Punta Europa Clause 1 7th subparagraph: ‘Owners’ means ‘the owners 
or managers (as relevant) of any vessel using the Terminal.’ 
71 Clauses 6 and 2, respectively 
72 ‘Conditions binding upon all users of Port Rashid Dubai’ 1st subparagraph 
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6.2.2 Basis of liability 
The first requirement for compensation under Norwegian law is that there is a basis of 
liability.  
 
All the CoU are to a certain extent built on the principle of unilateral liability. In the 
majority of the contracts the shipowner is required to pay for any loss ‘due to whatever 
reason and irrespective of whether there has been any negligence or default on the part of 
the vessel or the owners, their servants, agents73 or contractors’.74  
 
The expression ‘irrespective of whether there has been any negligence or default’ implies 
strict liability for the shipowner, since the terminal is to be indemnified for any loss 
regardless of fault by the shipowner or its servants. Strict liability constitutes a marked 
deviation from ordinary Norwegian law of damages, where the starting point is that 
negligence is a prerequisite of liability.  
 
Other CoU may contain less explicit formulations, like ‘howsoever and by whomsoever 
caused’,75 but these expressions should also be interpreted to imply strict liability. 
Moreover, ‘howsoever caused’ also implies that it is irrelevant whether liability is incurred 
in contract or in tort,76 and the same interpretation must also apply to the other contracts as 
a consequence of their structure.  
 
The Punta Europa Conditions open up for the possibility of liability on the part of the 
terminal in one instance, namely in respect of LPG vessels where ‘Losses arise as a direct 
result of the sole fault of the Company Indemnity Group.’77 This is an exception to the 
                                                 
73 The vessel’s agent is the local company which renders assistance to the vessel in port, inter alia in relation 
to port entry, provisions, bunkers and repatriation (Falkanger/Bull/Brautaset, p. 155). Thus, the agent is one 
of the shipowner’s servants. 
74 Qalhat Clause 1 (c), Bonny Clause 5.1 4th subparagraph, Braefoot Bay Section A (a) (ii). ‘Conditions 
binding upon all users of Port Rashid Dubai’ Clause c) also falls into this category but has a different 
wording. 
75 Sharjah Clause 3 a) 
76 Bull, p. 362 
77 Clause 2.1 (b) (ii) 
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general rule of strict liability, and at the same time an exception to the rule of liability 
without causation, discussed further in 6.2.3 below. 
 
A minority of the contracts stipulate ordinary negligence-based liability. The Ras Laffan, 
Altamira and Hazira Conditions, which are approved by the P&I insurers,78 state that the 
shipowner is liable for any loss suffered by the terminal or third parties ‘which involves the 
fault, wholly or partially, of the Master, officers or crew […], including negligent 
navigation’.79  
 
This brings us to the question of vicarious liability under the CoU. All the contracts hold 
the shipowner vicariously liable to some extent. In the indemnity clauses the shipowner is 
identified with either i) the faults of its servants80 or ii) the faults of its servants as well as 
the faults of the terminal and the terminal’s servants.81 
 
As regards i), this is in line with Norwegian law in the sense that the shipowner is 
vicariously liable for the faults of its servants. However, it is also possible to imagine a 
situation where the terminal’s servants may inflict damage to the terminal’s interests ‘in the 
service of the ship’, for which the shipowner would be liable under Norwegian law. In this 
respect, the scope of vicarious liability under these contracts is actually more limited than 
what follows from NMC § 151. 
 
The narrowest scope of vicarious liability is found in the three P&I-approved contracts, 
which merely require indemnification for faults by the vessel’s own personnel and make no 
reference to negligence neither by the shipowner’s other servants, agents and contractors 
nor by the terminal’s servants.  
                                                 
78 Cf. 7.2.2 below 
79 Ras Laffan Clause 6 (i), Altamira Clause 5 a) and Hazira Clause 2.8 
80 Qalhat Clause 1 (c), Bonny Clause 5.1 4th subparagraph, Braefoot Bay Section A (a) (ii), Kuwait Clause 4, 
Ras Laffan Clause 6 (i) and (ii), Altamira Clause 5 a) and b) and Hazira Clause 2.8 a) and b) 
81 Abu Dhabi Clause 4, Escravos Clauses 5 – 6 and Kharg Clause 4, Sharjah Clause 2, Port Rashid ‘Port and 
Customs Dept.: Conditions of use of any premises…’ and ‘Conditions binding upon all users of Port Rashid 
Dubai’ Clause c) 
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 As regards ii), whether the shipowner would also be liable for the faults of the terminal’s 
servants under Norwegian law depends on whether they were working in the service of the 
ship. If not, such liability would be a departure from ordinary law, and the mere possibility 
in this case opens for a wider scope of liability. Notably, an indemnification of the 
terminal’s faults would work as a disclaimer if the clause also included shipowner losses.  
 
Punta Europa’s exemption for the sole fault of the terminal would imply a departure from 
Norwegian law if the servants of the shipowner and terminal caused a loss together, for 
which the shipowner must bear the full liability.  
 
6.2.3 Causation 
The second requirement for compensation under Norwegian law is that there is a causal 
link between the damage and the injurious act. The basis of causation is the but for test: A 
is the cause of B if A is a necessary prerequisite of B’s occurrence.82 Causation is a 
requirement both in contract and tort. 
 
A closer examination of the Conditions of Use shows that the requirement for a causal link 
is either limited or non-existent. This has found somewhat different expressions in the 
contracts, and the same contract may use several expressions. However, where causation is 
mentioned, it is generally somehow related to ‘the use’ of the port or terminal.  
 
The Sharjah Conditions use the expression ‘during’ in relation to pilotage, whereby the 
port ‘accepts no responsibility for any damage occurring during berthing or unberthing’.83 
The object of potential damage is not specified, but it is likely that this clause is intended to 
                                                 
82 Lødrup, pp. 254 et seq. 
83 Clause 1 
 25
exclude liability for damage to both terminal and shipowner interests. The expression 
‘during’ is also found in the Port Rashid Conditions.84 
 
The expression ‘during’ has been interpreted under English law in The Polyduke case. The 
below clause was described by the court as ‘a far-reaching indemnity in favour of the 
plaintiffs’ (the terminal): 
 
‘If during, or by reason of the use by the vessel of the berths or other facilities […] 
any of them shall be damaged from whatsoever cause arising and notwithstanding 
that such damage be contributed to or by the negligence of the Company or its 
servant [sic] the vessel and her Owners shall hold the Company harmless and 
indemnified against all such loss or damage…’.85  
 
Prima facie, the expression ‘during’ is much wider than ‘in connection with’. There is no 
requirement for causation, only a limitation in time, whereas ‘in connection with’ indicates 
a more functional approach. Furthermore, the connector ‘or’ indicates that the damage may 
take place either during the vessel’s stay or as a consequence of the vessel’s use of the 
premises.  
 
The owner of the “Polyduke” pointed out that the word ‘during’ was not found in any other 
similar contracts, contending that this wording would lead to unreasonable risks, effectively 
placing the shipowner in the position of the terminal’s insurers and even making it liable 
for damage by exceptional tidal waves. The court conceded that the word ‘during’ could 
imply a more extreme meaning, but nevertheless held that this was not probable because no 
sensible court would construe the clause in such a manner since this would lead to an 
absurd result that none of the parties could have intended. Interestingly, the court added 
                                                 
84 ‘Port and Customs Dept.: Conditions of use of any premises…’. This is primarily a disclaimer clause, but 
works as an indemnity inter alia where it disclaims liability damage to the terminal’s own property. 
85 Clause 2 (d) 
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that in the context, the word ‘during’ must connote ‘in connection with’, which ‘would 
bring the clause—however harsh and one-sided—in line with many similar provisions’.86  
 
Thus, under English law ‘during’ is interpreted to connote ‘in connection with’, the latter of 
which is frequently found in the CoU.87 The Polyduke decision implies a restrictive 
interpretation of the word ‘during’, and this indemnity clause was upheld by the court.88  
 
The wording ‘in connection with’ implies that the causal requirement is very weak, thus 
opening for a wide range of circumstances. There is no requirement for causation in the 
traditional sense; instead a natural and reasonable connection between the damage or loss 
and the vessel’s use of the terminal will suffice.89  
 
Moreover, the triggering element is very comprehensive, insofar as it is satisfactory that the 
damage or loss has occurred in connection with ‘the [vessel’s] use’. Since in most of these 
contracts liability occurs regardless of fault on the part of the shipowner, the expression 
also clearly implies damage caused by third parties. Any act or omission reasonably 
connected with ‘the use’ is included.90  
 
Any temporal limitations within this expression are more or less given; if the damage 
occurs during the vessel’s arrival, stay or departure, such limitations are satisfied. 
 
The expression ‘arising out of or in connection with the use’ is found in the Punta Europa 
Conditions.91 ‘Arising out of’ is narrower, suggesting an element of causation between the 
damage and the vessel’s presence. However, since the expression is followed by the 
                                                 
86 p. 216 
87 Bonny Clause 5.1 4th subparagraph, Braefoot Bay Section A (a) (ii) and Qalhat Clause 1 (c) 
88 6.4 below discusses the possibility of setting aside or adjusting such liability clauses under Norwegian law. 
89 Bull, p. 385 
90 Bull, p. 386 
91 Clause 2.1 (a) 
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wording ‘in connection with’ as well as a disclaimer of negligence on the part of the 
terminal, it is clear that all liability is nevertheless meant to lie with the shipowner.92  
 
Another usual expression is ‘in connection with or by reason of the use’.93 ‘By reason of’ is 
more limited than ‘in connection with’ and, similarly to ‘arising out of’, suggests an 
element of causation, but even more so. When damage occurs ‘by reason of the use’ the 
vessel’s mere presence is not enough to trigger liability; the expression suggests some 
causal activity on the vessel’s side.  
 
The Port Rashid Conditions use the expression ‘directly or indirectly attributable to’,94 
which in my opinion equals ‘by reason of the use’. However, since these expressions never 
occur alone but are always accompanied by ‘in connection with’, this legal distinction does 
not have any practical effect.  
 
The Port Rashid Conditions also contain several other, seemingly redundant causal 
expressions. While in one place there is a requirement for causation by the shipowner, 
stating that the user shall be liable for ‘any loss or damage directly or indirectly caused by 
them or their servants’,95 this requirement is neutralised by another provision in the same 
contract which makes the shipowner liable ‘from what-so-ever cause’.96 Still, the aggregate 
effect is that the terminal will be held harmless in any case.  
 
More interestingly, the same contract opens up for liability on behalf of the port in relation 
to tug damage if ‘caused by want of reasonable care on the part of the Port to make its tugs 
seaworthy for the navigation of the tugs during the towing or their services’.97 However, 
‘the burden of proving any failure to exercise such reasonable care’ lies with the 
                                                 
92 Bull, p. 386 
93 Escravos Clause 5, Kharg Clause 4, Kuwait Clause 4 and Abu Dhabi Clause 4 
94 ‘Port and Customs Dept.: Conditions of use of any premises…’ 
95 ‘Conditions binding upon all users of Port Rashid Dubai’ Clause c) 
96 ‘Port and Customs Dept.: Conditions of use of any premises…’ 
97 ‘Conditions of tug hire’ Clause 2 2nd subparagraph 
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shipowner, and this reversed burden creates a more stringent form of liability than the 
ordinary negligence-based one.98  
 
Also the Sharjah Conditions are unclear at one point. The shipowner and/or charterer are to 
be held liable ‘[i]n the event of any accident occurring, howsoever caused, which involves 
port stevedores’ or others during cargo operations or shifting/hauling.99 It is not clear from 
the context whether the accident is inflicted onto the stevedores or caused by them, and 
thus the shipowner should be prepared for both interpretations.  
 
Generally, it appears that as long as the loss or damage is in any way related to the vessel, 
the shipowner is liable even though other causes have contributed or the damage appears to 
be an unforeseeable consequence of the vessel’s actions. Simply put, the shipowner is 
liable even if external circumstances like the weather or other injurious parties like the 
terminal or third parties have contributed.  
 
Nevertheless, in the Ras Laffan, Hazira and Altamira Conditions liability is negligence-
based,100 and these contracts do not use the expression ‘in connection with the use’. 
Admittedly, the Ras Laffan and Altamira Conditions use the wording ‘related to the 
vessel’s use’101 but supply it with a requirement for negligence. Thus, in this respect these 
three contracts follow the Norwegian rules on compensation; i.e. the shipowner is liable for 
damage caused by fault or neglect in accordance with ordinary principles of causation.  
 
As mentioned in 6.2.2, Punta Europa exempts the shipowner from liability in one instance, 
namely where the losses are caused exclusively by the terminal. This constitutes an 
exception from the general liability regardless of causation. The shipowner is still liable for 
damage caused by its servants as well as for damage caused together with another party, 
either the terminal or a third party, but not for damage caused by the terminal alone.  
                                                 
98 This clause is working both as an indemnity and disclaimer and is thus also discussed in 6.3.2 below 
99 Clause 3 b) 
100 Cf. 6.2.2 above 
101 Clauses 6 (i) and 5 (b), respectively 
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 6.2.4 Indemnified parties. Losses covered 
This section firstly presents the indemnified parties and secondly examines what losses are 
covered by the indemnification.  
 
In the contracts ‘the Company’, i.e. the terminal’s owner/operator, is the object of 
indemnification. The owner/operator is typically one or several large petroleum companies, 
which are either private or state-owned. Exceptions are the Sharjah and Port Rashid 
Conditions where the contractual partner is the public port authorities. In the Hazira 
Conditions the contractual partner also appears to be the port, but in the form of a 
privatised company called ‘Hazira Port Private Limited’.102 Sometimes associated 
companies, etc. are also included in the indemnification. Inter alia the Punta Europa 
Conditions specify several layers of corporate entities on the terminal side,103 all of which 
are to be indemnified.104  
 
As regards losses covered, the third prerequisite for compensation under Norwegian law is 
that there is a real and measurable economic loss. When basis of liability has been 
established, the starting point under Norwegian law is that the injured party is entitled to 
have all its losses covered, although contributory negligence by the injured party may 
reduce compensation.105 Losses covered are often divided into direct losses, extraordinary 
expenses and consequential losses. Moreover, the principle of foreseeability limits recovery 
of losses with respect to adequate causation and foreseeability of loss. Thus, there is a close 
connection between causation and losses covered.  
 
                                                 
102 Clause 2. 4th subparagraph 
103 Clause 1 stipulates that ‘Company Group’ consists of a large number of listed international petroleum 
companies, which again form part of a ‘Company Indemnity Group’, including the group’s affiliates, 
contractors and sub-contractors as well as their respective employees.  
104 Clause 2.1 
105 Torts Act § 5-1 
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The starting point under the CoU is that all losses are to be indemnified irrespective of 
foreseeability and size. The Punta Europa Conditions define losses as follows: ‘“Losses” 
means any claims, actions, demands, losses, liabilities, damages, costs and/or expenses 
(including legal fees on a full indemnity basis and sums by way of settlement or 
compromise) of whatever nature’.106  
 
Types of loss to be indemnified fall into three main categories, namely i) loss and damage 
to port/terminal interests, ii) third party liabilities and iii) expenses related to pollution and 
wreck removal. 
 
As regards category i), indemnification of terminal interests comprises any loss or damage 
to the terminal’s property as well as ‘injury or death to any person employed on the 
premises’.107 It is clear that all types of claim arising from such damage and loss are 
covered. 
 
The Sharjah Conditions specifically mention indemnification of consequential damage.108 
Any consequential damage whatsoever is to be indemnified, which may include losses both 
in production and profits. Also the Port Rashid Conditions mention consequential losses in 
one instance, namely in relation to the use of tugs.109 Nevertheless, in my opinion 
consequential losses are also covered under the other contracts by the wording ‘any loss’, 
which should be interpreted to mean both direct and consequential losses. The same line of 
reasoning applies to delay, which is specifically mentioned in the Escravos Conditions.110  
 
Consequential losses are as a starting point considered sufficiently foreseeable under 
Norwegian law,111 which makes these provisions in line with ordinary legal principles. 
                                                 
106 Clause 1 5th subparagraph 
107 Bonny Clause 5.1 4th subparagraph, Braefoot Bay Section A (a) (ii) and Qalhat Clause 1 (c) 
108 Clause 2 
109 ‘Conditions of tug hire’ Clause 2 
110 Clause 6 b) 
111 Falkanger/Bull/Brautaset, p. 287 
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Case law supports that loss of profits are generally recoverable.112 However, the 
requirement for causation must be satisfied, and the more indirect a loss is, the less likely it 
is to be recoverable. Since the requirement for causation is limited under these contracts, 
their liability for consequential losses may well exceed what would be recoverable under 
Norwegian law.  
 
As regards category ii), the terminal may require indemnification in two different instances, 
either from damage imposed by the terminal to third parties, or from damage caused by the 
shipowner to third parties where the terminal and shipowner are held jointly and severally 
liable.  
 
All the Conditions except Punta Europa require indemnification of third party liabilities to 
some extent. 
 
The Escravos Conditions are the most comprehensive and require both types of third party 
indemnification. Firstly, the terminal is to be held harmless from any damage or injury 
caused by the vessel to any third party,113 which applies if the terminal is held jointly and 
severally liable with the shipowner. Secondly, the terminal requires indemnification from 
‘all and any action, liabilities, claims, damages, cost, awards and expenses arising whether 
directly or indirectly out of any loss, damage, personal injury, including death, or delay, of 
whatsoever nature, occasioned to any third party or any vessel (her Owners and crew)’ 
whether or not caused by the terminal or its servants.114 This implies an indemnification of 
damages caused by the terminal.  
 
The far-reaching disclaimer by Port Rashid requires indemnification of damage to ‘other 
vessels and or cargo and or other property ashore or afloat or fixed or movable and loss of 
life of and or personal injury to any person or persons what-so-ever, and or any legal 
                                                 
112 Rt. 1987.1649 NSC Ny Dolsøy, which concerned an interpretation of the standardised loss rule in the 
NMC (current § 279).  
113 Clause 5 
114 Clause 6 a) 
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liability’ regardless of own fault115 and thereby includes any third party damage regardless 
of who caused it. The contract also requires indemnification of tug damage to third parties, 
but only related to claims for personal injury and loss of life.116  
 
The third party indemnification in Sharjah appears to be slightly narrower, since the only 
third party objects mentioned are ‘other vessels and craft’.117 Theoretically, there may be 
other third party damage which is not covered. On the other hand, such indemnification 
includes both damage by vessel and tugs. 
 
However, the majority of the Conditions only require indemnification of ‘all and any 
claim, damages, costs and expenses arising out of any loss, injury, death or damage caused 
to any third party by the Vessel’,118 i.e. indemnification from the shipowner’s liability if the 
terminal is held jointly and severally liable. Under Norwegian law, if there is joint and 
several liability the injured party may claim the entire compensation from either party,119 
with a subsequent redistribution between shipowner and terminal in recourse. Thus, if the 
entire loss is channelled directly to the shipowner, this is a deviation from ordinary 
background law.  
 
The Punta Europa Conditions do not mention third parties, except from stipulating that the 
terminal’s associates shall obtain third party rights under the English Contracts (Rights of 
Third Parties) Act 1999.120 Thus, if third party damage occurs in connection with this 
contractual relationship, there is an actual possibility that the loss will lie where it falls, 
which is in accordance with traditional contract law. 
 
                                                 
115 ‘Port and Customs Dept.: Conditions of use of any premises…’ 
116 ‘Conditions of tug hire’ Clause 2 
117 Sharjah Clause 2 
118 Qalhat Clause 1 d), Kuwait Clause 4, Bonny Clause 5.1 5th subparagraph, Braefoot Bay Section A, (a) (ii), 
Kharg Clause 4 2nd subparagraph, Abu Dhabi Clause 4, Ras Laffan Clause 6 (ii), Altamira Clause 5 b) and 
Hazira Clause 2.8 d) 
119 Torts Act § 5-3,1 
120 Clause 1 (a) gives a third party the right to enforce a contractual term ‘if the contract expressly provides 
that he may’. 
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The last category iii) comprises expenses related to wreck removal and pollution. 
 
As a starting point, liability for wreck removal may be either statutory or contractual.121 
Under Norwegian law, public authorities may instruct the shipowner to remove a wreck 
within certain time limits,122 but if the matter is urgent and the shipowner does not comply 
or there is not sufficient time to give notice, the authorities may remove the wreck 
themselves.123 Furthermore, the shipowner’s non-compliance with notice of wreck removal 
is a criminal offence, punishable by fines.124  
 
The majority of the CoU contain specific wreck removal clauses, and the wording is almost 
identical in all contracts: ‘If any vessel sinks, grounds, or otherwise becomes in the opinion 
of the Company an obstruction or danger […] and the owner of the vessel fails to remove 
[it] within a period stipulated by the Company, the Company shall be empowered to take 
any steps it may deem necessary to remove the obstruction or danger. Any expenses of such 
removal shall be recoverable from the owner of the vessel.’125 This liability presupposes 
prior notification of the shipowner, which is thus less far-reaching than Norwegian 
legislation.  
 
However, the Kharg and Abu Dhabi Conditions have stricter wreck removal provisions 
than the others. The former stipulate that the wreck may at any time be blown up or 
otherwise destroyed at the shipowner’s expense,126 and the latter states that the shipowner 
is not automatically entitled to notification before wreck removal, and if notified, non-
compliance with instructions of wreck removal is a criminal offence.127 Thus, these 
provisions are in line with Norwegian legislation.  
                                                 
121 Falkanger/Bull/Brautaset, p. 184 
122 The Harbour Act of 8 June 1984 (No. 51) § 18 3rd subparagraph 
123 The Harbour Act § 20 
124 The Harbour Act § 28 b. 
125 Punta Europa Section ‘Assistance, Advice or Instruction’ 3rd subparagraph cf. Kuwait Clause 5, Braefoot 
Bay Section A (a) Clause (iv), Ras Laffan Clause 7, Altamira Clause 6 cf. Clause 5 (c), Hazira Clause 2.9 and 
Bonny Clause 5.1 6th subparagraph 
126 Clause 6 (a) and (b) 
127 Clauses 5 and 6 
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 The Escravos, Port Rashid, Qalhat and Sharjah Conditions contain no mention of wreck 
removal. However, it should be noted that their general indemnity clauses cover any 
damage and loss, and should thus be assumed to cover wreck removal on such basis.  
 
As regards pollution, liability for environmental damage is statutory in most shipping 
nations, which have ratified conventions or passed national legislation in order to prevent 
pollution incidents, effectively manage such incidents and ensure that the damage and 
necessary measures are aptly compensated for.128  
 
The MARPOL 1973/78 Convention identifies five main marine pollutants: i) oil, ii) liquid 
substances in bulk (e.g. gases and chemicals), iii) harmful substances in packaged form, iv) 
sewage and v) garbage. The IMO129 has also recently approved conventions regulating 
pollution from ballast water and anti-fouling130 systems.  
 
Approximately half of the examined CoU specifically require indemnification from 
pollution from the vessel.131 In Norway the main legislation on pollution is the Pollution 
Act of 13 March 1981 (No. 6), which stipulates that a person is strictly liable for 
pollution,132 and thus these provisions are in line with ordinary legal principles.  
 
The Kharg Conditions contain an indemnity provision exclusively against oil pollution, 
comprising pollution from the terminal’s loading arms, which is normally the terminal’s 
responsibility according to standard risk allocation in the trade. The provision requires 
indemnification of damages including full cost of preventive measures to avoid fire hazards 
                                                 
128 Falkanger/Bull/Brautaset, p. 195 
129 The International Maritime Organization is the United Nations specialised agency for the safety and 
security in shipping and prevention of marine pollution by ships (URL: www.imo.org) 
130 A type of paint which prevents growth on the ship’s underwater surfaces 
131 Inter alia Escravos Clause 6 b) and Punta Europa Clause 2.1 (a) (ii) 
132 § 55,1 
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as well as any clean-up costs, and ‘such cost shall constitute a debt payable by the vessel or 
her Owners to the Company.’ 133  
 
NMC Chapter 10 regulates oil pollution from ships under Norwegian law. The applicable 
legal provision for non-oil tankers is NMC § 208, which makes the shipowner strictly liable 
for oil pollution and preventive measures, cf. § 191.  
 
Thus, with respect to oil pollution the Kharg Conditions are in line with Norwegian law. 
However, despite the extended physical area of application, this provision is more limited 
than the legislation with regard to scope of pollutants. 
 
The Kuwait Conditions require indemnification for pollution to the environment including 
the territorial waters of Kuwait.134 This inclusion of the territorial waters is actually less 
stringent than Norwegian legislation, which imposes liability for pollution on the 
Norwegian part of the continental shelf.135  
 
The Sharjah Conditions stipulate that ‘any kind of pollution is strictly prohibited’.136 The 
master, shipowner, charterer and/or operator are jointly and severally liable to a fine up to 
Dhs 500,000 in addition to any other expenses incurred towards removal, clean-up and 
potential third party damage. The fine is not an indemnity since it applies regardless of 
actual costs incurred, but it will also work towards paying off the shipowner’s pollution 
liability.  
 
Along the same lines of reasoning as for wreck removal, it must be assumed that pollution 
is covered under the general indemnity clauses in the contracts where it is not specifically 
regulated. 
 
                                                 
133 Clause 5 
134 Clause 4 
135 Cf. NMC § 208,1 
136 Clause 10 
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6.2.5 Limitation of liability 
The starting point under Norwegian law of damages is that liability is unlimited when the 
conditions for compensation have been met.  
 
However, in maritime law there is a strong tradition for limiting the shipowner’s liability, 
and Norway has ratified international convention-based limitation regimes. These rules, 
being an exception to the general rule of unlimited liability, give the shipowner a right of 
limitation.  
 
The rules concerning the shipowner’s right of limitation are found in the NMC. Chapter 9 
contains the global limitation rules, Chapter 10 contains the oil pollution limitation rules, 
Chapter 12 contains rules on limitation funds and proceedings and Chapter 13 regulates the 
carrier’s right to limit its liability. Limitation of liability for oil pollution from non-tankers 
is regulated by the global limitation rules.137 
 
The CoU do not discuss the relationship between the contractual liability and the 
international limitation regime. The general rule under these contracts is that the size of the 
claim is irrelevant, and there is unlimited liability for the shipowner138 and sometimes also 
for the charterer and/or master. 
 
As a starting point the shipowner’s statutory right of limitation applies also to contractual 
liabilities. On the other hand, the global limitation rules are not compulsory in favour of the 
shipowner: NMC § 171 merely states that the shipowner can limit its liability under 
Chapter 9. Thus, it is quite clear that the shipowner is entitled to waive such rights towards 
a contractual party.139 Consequently, in legal proceedings the court would have to examine 
whether the signed contract evidences an explicit waiver of such rights, and if this 
                                                 
137 NMC § 208,3 cf. Chapter 9 
138 ‘…the vessel and the Owners shall hold The Company […] and affiliates, harmless from and indemnified 
without limitation…’ (Escravos Clause 4) 
139 Bull, p. 375 
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requirement for a waiver is not found to be satisfied, then the shipowner’s right must be 
upheld.140  
 
As regards the shipowner’s liability for wreck removal, the starting point under Norwegian 
law is that it may be limited under the global limitation regime,141 and it is not a 
precondition for limitation that the liability is based in statute.142 In the context of gas 
carriers, the right of limitation for expenses related to removal of dangerous cargo may also 
arise143 as well as measures to avert associated losses.144 Consequently, the unlimited 
liability for wreck removal arising from the CoU is not in line with Norwegian law, and in 
legal proceedings the court would have to consider whether the shipowner has explicitly 
waived its right of limitation. 
 
It should be noted that the three P&I-approved CoU contain liability limitations, and the 
limitation amount is set to USD 150 million.145 Moreover, the Punta Europa Conditions 
stipulate a limit of USD 50 million for LPG vessels only ‘or such higher amount as is 
available by way of insurance coverage from a recognised P&I club’.146 Notably, the 
Punta Europa Conditions, as the only ones in the selection, specifically require the 
shipowner to have proper P&I insurance in place,147 but are not approved.148 
                                                
 
6.3 The terminal’s disclaiming of liability for shipowner interests 
The CoU contain far-reaching disclaimers on the part of the terminal concerning liability 
for shipowner interests. Disclaimer clauses are widespread in international contract law, 
 
140 Bull, p. 376 
141 NMC § 172a 1) 
142 Falkanger/Bull/Brautaset, p. 184 
143 NMC § 172a 2) 
144 NMC § 172a 3) 
145 Ras Laffan Clause 11, Altamira Clause 10 and Hazira Clause 2.10. Note: The Altamira Conditions Clause 
11 establishes that such limitation of liability shall not prejudice any claim by the Company under general 
principles of law or equity. 
146 Clause 2.1 (b) (i) 
147 Clause 2.4 
148 Cf. 7.2.2 below 
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and they operate to the effect as to disclaim some or all liability of one of the parties. Far-
reaching disclaimer clauses on behalf of one contractual party suggest that the contract is 
biased in favour of that party.  
 
This section will discuss the practical solutions in the contracts with respect to the 
terminal’s disclaiming of liability for shipowner interests. In 6.3.1 the various forms of 
disclaimed liability will be outlined, whereas 6.3.2 analyses the importance of fault. 6.3.3 
presents the different areas covered by the disclaimers and 6.3.4 examines disclaimed 
losses.  
 
6.3.1 Forms of disclaimed liability 
In the CoU liability is disclaimed on behalf of i) the terminal owner/operator and 
associates, ii) public bodies and iii) employees and contractors including pilots and tugs. 
 
As regards i), when the terminal disclaims liability on behalf of itself and associated 
companies it disclaims direct liability (as opposed to vicarious liability for servants). Gross 
negligence and intent are not exempted from the disclaimers, and thus it must be assumed 
that the terminal disclaims all degrees of fault.149 
 
The terminals always disclaim their own direct liability, and the majority also disclaim 
direct liability on behalf of associated companies. 
  
However, whose liability is disclaimed may vary along with what areas the disclaimers 
apply to. The Punta Europa Conditions serve as a good example: With regard to 
navigational assistance, the terminal, any associated company, any other owner of property 
used at the terminal as well as its agents and servants (in whatever capacity they may be 
acting) all disclaim liability.150 With respect to the general safety of the port, only the 
                                                 
149 Cf. 6.3.2 below 
150 ‘Assistance, Advice or Instruction’ 1st subparagraph 
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Company disclaims liability,151 and concerning liability for vessel, crew and cargo, the 
entire Company Indemnity Group disclaims liability.152  
 
In the Sharjah, Port Rashid and Hazira Conditions the contractual partner disclaiming 
liability is not the terminal, but the port.153 The Port Rashid Conditions firstly disclaim 
liability on the part of the entire ‘Government of Dubai and those acting under its 
authority’ for any liability occurring at the premises.154 Secondly, ‘neither the Government 
of His Highness the Emir of Dubai nor the Port Operators appointed thereby nor their 
[sic] nor either of their servants or agents’ is liable for any losses whatsoever.155  
 
As regards ii), some of the terminals disclaim liability on behalf of public bodies. In such 
case the public bodies are third parties to the contract,156 and the disclaimers apply on their 
behalf. Contractual parties may freely allocate third party liabilities arising from ordinary 
principles of torts and damages.157 Such third party disclaimers must be distinguished from 
the disclaiming of vicarious liability in the Sharjah and Port Rashid Conditions, where the 
public authorities are the contractual partners, thus disclaiming faults on behalf of their 
servants and contractors.158  
 
In relation to pilots and tugs, the terminals disclaim liability in either of two ways, either i) 
vicarious liability for their faults as contractors, which would be the case under Norwegian 
law, or ii) on behalf of the pilot/tug as a third party. In the latter case, the shipowner 
promises not to hold the pilot/tug responsible for damage, which serves as third party 
promise under the contract. Thus, the terminal is the party issuing the disclaimer, but the 
disclaimer also applies on behalf of the pilot and/or tug. 
                                                 
151 ‘Use of Sea berths, Loading Lines, Facilities, Gear and Equipment’ 2nd subparagraph 
152 Clause 2.2. Cf. footnote 97 
153 Cf. 6.2.4 above 
154 Port and Customs Dept.: ‘Conditions of use of any premises…’ 
155 ‘Conditions binding upon all users of Port Rashid Dubai’ Clause a) 
156 Cf. Qalhat Clause 1 (f), which disclaims liability on behalf of the Government of Oman. Cf. also Braefoot 
Bay Section A Clause (v), which disclaim liability for any delay caused by the faults of the port and its vessel 
traffic services 
157 Cf. 6.1 above 
158 Sharjah Clause 3 c) and ‘Conditions binding upon all users of Port Rashid Dubai’ Clause b) 
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 As regards iii), all contracts disclaim vicarious liability for the faults of any and all persons 
working for the terminal or the port, including servants, agents and contractors.159 The CoU 
do not contain exhaustive lists of servants, but they all mention the faults of pilots, tugs and 
other navigational services.160 Typically, the faults of pilots, tugs and mooring personnel 
are disclaimed in relation to port safety and navigational services, whereas the disclaimers 
concerning damage caused by the terminal more generally exclude the faults of ‘any 
servant, agent or contractor’.161  
 
Also the P&I-approved contracts disclaim liability for the faults of servants. For instance 
Altamira disclaims the faults of the ‘Company Representatives’,162 who are defined as ‘any 
director, officer, employee, contractor, servant, consultant, advisor, agent or 
representative of the Company in whatever capacity they may be acting’.163  
 
Such disclaiming of vicarious liability on behalf of employees and contractors is not in 
accordance with Norwegian law. The starting point under the law of damages is that a legal 
person is directly liable in negligence as well as vicariously liable for the faults of its 
servants.164 
 
6.3.2 The fault element 
The majority of the terminals disclaim all and any liability regardless of fault on the part of 
themselves or their servants. Excluded faults are typically ‘any act, neglect, omission or 
                                                 
159 Inter alia Escravos Clauses 2 – 3 and Abu Dhabi Clause 1 (b) 
160 Escravos, Punta Europa, Hazira and Port Rashid disclaim liability for pilotage, tugs, berthing services and 
other navigational facilities by stating that the pilots, loading masters and crews of pilot and mooring boats, 
etc. become the servants of the vessel’s master for the duration of the operation. Cf.  Sharjah Clause 1, where 
the pilot’s advice ‘shall not under any circumstance exonerate the Master and Owners from liability’. 
161 Inter alia Bonny Clause 5.1 3rd subparagraph, Escravos Clause 3 and Qalhat Clause 1 (b) 
162 Clauses 3 – 4  
163 ‘Conditions of Use’ 4th subsection 
164 Torts Act § 2-1 and ordinary background law 
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default’.165 This must be understood to include ordinary negligence, gross negligence and 
intent. 
  
The starting point under Norwegian law of damages is that a person can disclaim liability 
for the faults of others as well as for its own ordinary negligence, but not for its own intent. 
It is debatable whether liability for a person’s own gross negligence can be disclaimed.166  
 
All CoU expressly state that the terminal disclaims liability irrespective of fault or 
neglect.167 This express statement may be a reaction to the fact that some jurisdictions have 
refused to accept disclaimers of negligence-based liability without an express statement to 
that effect.168 In addition to personal fault, the Escravos Conditions also disclaim liability 
for property fault, i.e. the ‘fault or defect in any berth, premises, facilities, property, gear, 
craft, or equipment of any sort’.169  
 
However, the Port Rashid Conditions exempt an element of fault from the disclaimer on 
behalf of the tugs. The port specifically disclaims liability for unseaworthiness in relation 
to the tugs, provided that ‘such liability […] is not caused by want of reasonable care on 
the part of the Port to make its tugs seaworthy for the navigation of the tugs during the 
towing or their services. The burden of proving any failure to exercise such reasonable 
care, shall lie on the Owner of the tow’.170 This implies firstly, that unseaworthiness as a 
starting point is disclaimed, secondly, that the port may be liable for damage caused by the 
tugs if it has not exercised reasonable case in ensuring seaworthiness, and thirdly, that the 
                                                 
165 Inter alia Kuwait, Kharg and Abu Dhabi Clause 2 
166 Hagstrøm: Om grensene for ansvarsfraskrivelse, særlig i næringsforhold, TFR-1996-421, pp. 426 and 448 
et seq., Kaasen: Petroleumskontrakter med kommentarer til NF 05 og NTK 05 (2006), pp. 601 et seq. and 
Bull, p. 394. Cf. also 6.4 below 
167 Inter alia Kharg Clause 2: ’…whether or not it is due in whole or in part to any act, neglect omission or 
default…’  
168 Bull, p. 392. Cf. also 6.4 below 
169 Clause 3 
170 Clause 2 2nd subparagraph 
 42
burden of proving such lack of reasonable care is reversed, i.e. it lies with the shipowner, 
thus creating a more stringent form of liability than the ordinary negligence-based one.171 
 
The disclaiming of liability finds a parallel in the indemnity provisions, in the sense that all 
types of fault are to be indemnified. The three P&I-approved contracts state that indemnity 
shall be negligence-based on the part of the vessel’s personnel, but this includes all types of 
negligence, also ordinary negligence.172  
 
6.3.3 Areas covered by the disclaimers 
The disclaimers comprise several areas: navigational services, general safety of the port 
and safety and suitability of berth and terminal premises.  
 
Disclaimers of liability for shipowner interests will typically be divided between 
navigational services, like pilots, tugs, buoys and markings on the one hand, and terminal 
services on the other hand. 
 
Furthermore, the majority of the contracts contain separate disclaimers concerning port 
safety, whereby liability for the safety and suitability of the premises is disclaimed. These 
clauses are usually expressed to the effect that no warranty is given. No warranty means 
that there is no guarantee of performance or fulfilment, and thus ‘no warranty’ implies no 
liability.  
 
The Escravos Conditions serve as a example: ‘While The Company exercises due care to 
ensure that the berths […] are safe and suitable for vessels permitted or invited to use 
them, no guarantee, express or limited, of such safety and suitability is given’.173 
 
                                                 
171 Cf. 6.2.3 above 
172 Inter alia Ras Laffan Clause 6: ‘…which involves the fault, wholly or partially, of the Master, officers or 
crew, including negligent navigation’ 
173 Clause 3. Punta Europa, Abu Dhabi, Kharg and Kuwait are almost identical in their wording 
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Another version of the warranty exclusion is found in the Hazira Conditions: ‘Company 
[…] does not represent or warrant that the Port and Port Facilities are safe or suitable for 
any vessel.’174 In relation to port safety, the Hazira Conditions also disclaim liability 
‘irrespective of whether or not the vessel is within the notified limits of the Port’.175 
 
In contrast to the terminals’ own warranty disclaimers, some contracts require a suitability 
warranty from the shipowner on behalf of the vessel.176  
 
6.3.4 Disclaimed losses 
The contracts stipulate a wide range of losses disclaimed by the terminal. The main types 
are loss, damage, delay, personal injury, loss of life and any actions by third parties.177  
 
All CoU disclaim liability for ‘any loss, damage or delay’ to vessel, cargo and crew.178 
Port Rashid’s disclaimer clause is much more complex and verbose than the others, but 
does not appear to extend the scope.179 Actions by third parties are disclaimed either in the 
form of disclaimers or indemnity clauses.180 
                                                
 
The majority of the CoU also disclaim liability for losses directly or indirectly caused by 
labour disputes, strikes, etc.181 Hazira’s version is particularly wide, comprising ‘the 
consequences of war, riots, civil commotions, acts of terrorism or sabotage, strikes, 
lockouts, disputes stoppages or labour disturbances […] or anything done in 
contemplation or furtherance thereof’.182 
 
174 Clause 2.3. Altamira Clause 2 contains a similar wording. 
175 Clause 2.2 
176 Inter alia Qalhat Clause 1 1st subparagraph and Abu Dhabi Clause 1 
177 Inter alia Escravos and Kuwait Clause 2 
178 Inter alia Sharjah Clause 3 a) – c), Braefoot Bay Section A (a) Clause (i), Bonny Clause 5.1 4th 
subparagraph and Port Rashid’s ‘Port and Customs Dept.: Conditions of use of any premises…’, ‘Conditions 
binding upon all users of Port Rashid Dubai’ Clause a) and ‘Conditions of tug hire’ Clause 2 
179 ‘Port and Customs Dept.: Conditions of use of any premises…’ 
180 Cf. 6.1 above 
181 Cf. inter alia Punta Europa page 4 6th subparagraph, Escravos Clause 4, Kharg Clause 3, Kuwait Clause 3 
and Altamira Clause 4 
182 Clause 2.7 
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 The starting point under Norwegian law of damages is that all losses resulting from an 
injurious act are to be compensated without limitation if sufficiently foreseeable.183 Thus, 
these disclaimers do not follow ordinary legal principles, since the shipowner does not 
recover its losses. On the other hand, if the loss is unforeseeable, the disclaimers are in line 
with background law, since the terminal is not liable for unforeseeable consequences in any 
case. However, the requirement for foreseeability in contract is less stringent towards the 
injured party than in tort. 
 
Some special provisions are mentioned below: 
 
The Braefoot Bay and Bonny Conditions contain separate clauses concerning claims 
related to delayed cargo operations. The former contract disclaims liability for ‘any 
demurrage, loss claims or demands whatsoever’ resulting from faults by the port,184 and 
the latter disclaims liability for ‘any costs incurred by a vessel, its Owners […] as a result 
of delay to or suspension of loading or discharging or a refusal to load or discharge all or 
part of a nominated shipment, or a requirement to vacate the jetty arising from Safety 
Regulations’.185  
 
The Abu Dhabi Conditions contain a separate disclaimer concerning any damage claims 
‘for damage allegedly incurred by ships’ during anchoring and mooring operations.186 
 
The necessity of these latter provisions is debatable, since the general disclaimers in any 
case comprise any loss, damage and delay. 
 
                                                 
183 Cf. 6.2.4 above 
184 Section A (a) Clause (v) 
185 Clause 5.1 11th subsection 
186 ‘Damage Claims’ page 6 
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6.4 May the contractual provisions be set aside or adjusted? 
As shown above, the CoU deviate from ordinary Norwegian legal principles in several 
areas by allocating all risk to one party. This section raises the question of whether such 
liability provisions could be set aside or adjusted by a Norwegian court.  
 
Norwegian law distinguishes between absolute and relative invalidating factors. Absolute 
invalidating factors are inter alia violations of law or decency (as stipulated in NL 5-1-
2187), insanity, duress, etc. Such factors will render the contract null and void.  
                                                
 
However, the Formation of Contracts Act § 36 introduced the relative approach as starting 
point for setting aside contracts, whereby the parties can choose to affirm. This provision 
gives Norwegian courts a considerable discretionary measure for setting aside contracts on 
a case-by-case basis, and these days the courts would probably base such a decision on § 36 
rather than on NL 5-1-2, due to the flexibility of the former provision.188  
 
Excerpt from § 36:  
 
‘An agreement may be overturned wholly or partly or altered insofar as it would be 
unreasonable or in breach of proper business conduct to invoke it. […] 
 
Such decision must emphasise not only on the contents of the agreement, the position 
of the parties and the circumstances surrounding the formation of the agreement, but 
also subsequently occurred conditions and the other circumstances…’.189 
 
The effect of § 36 manifests itself on two levels; either directly, whereby the court relies on 
the provision to adjust a contract, or indirectly, in applying a test of reasonableness without 
direct reference.190 Nevertheless, the courts tend to exercise considerable restrictiveness in 
 
187 ‘Kong Christian Den Femtis Norske Lov’ of 15 April 1687 
188 Bull, p. 394 
189 Unofficial translation 
190 Hagstrøm: Ansvarsfraskrivelse, p. 459 
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employing this provision. Moreover, since the provision was not introduced until 1983, 
jurisprudence from the other Scandinavian countries, which have parallel provisions, must 
be relied on for interpretation.191 
 
Concerning commercial parties the starting point is that where the distribution of risk is 
clearly defined in the contract, the court will not interfere due to considerations of equality 
between negotiating parties and the need for predictability in professional intercourse.192 
Censorship in this area would undermine contractual freedom with its rewards and 
downfalls.  
 
Although unreasonable risk allocation may in principle cause a provision to be set aside, 
this is mainly applied to consumer contracts. As of date the Norwegian Supreme Court has 
never relied on § 36 in a contractual claim between typical commercial parties.193 
However, there is an earlier obiter statement by the Supreme Court that when a liability 
disclaimer is very far-reaching, it ‘is natural to interpret such a disclaimer restrictively’.194 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has also stated that it is not doubtful that § 36 also applies to 
contracts between professional parties.195 Furthermore, § 36 has been used by the court of 
arbitration to set aside provisions in shipping contracts on the basis that the provision 
would otherwise result in economic imbalance between the parties.196 
                                                
 
This section will discuss whether the liability provisions of the CoU could be set aside or 
adjusted based on either i) monopoly or ii) disclaiming of liability for gross 
negligence/intent. The former is related to contract formation and the latter to contractual 
contents.  
 
191 Hagstrøm: Ansvarsfraskrivelse, p. 461 
192 Cf. ND 1990.204 NA the Ula case, where it was stated that commercial contracts are profit-based and will 
thus lead the parties to assume calculated risks 
193 Woxholth, p. 367 
194 Rt. 1961.1334, p. 1338 (unofficial translation). The case concerned a disclaimer as basis for the 
shipowner’s recourse. Adjustment based on § 36 is also mentioned obiter in Rt. 1994.626, but the question 
was not decided on because the injurious party was not part of the company management (Hagstrøm: 
Ansvarsfraskrivelse, p. 422) 
195 Rt. 1999.922 NSC, p. 943 
196 ND 1985.234 NA Mascot 
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 As regards i), monopoly is an example of inequality in the negotiating position between 
commercial parties. If only one person may provide services, it is considered monopoly. 
The precondition of choice among several contract partners fails if the party offering 
services is not competing in a free market but has monopoly and the other person is in a 
state of dependency.197 Taking advantage of such dependency is a form of exploitation, 
which under § 36 is a deficiency in the ‘circumstances surrounding the formation of the 
agreement’.198 Exploiting for personal profit the dependency of another may be sufficient 
grounds for setting aside a contract. Although this theory is originally related to emergency 
situations, it has been asserted that it also applies to economic interests.199 The preparatory 
works of § 36 also state that conditions giving one party unreasonable means of pressuring 
the other may be subject to censorship.200 Subsequently, if a person’s opportunity to choose 
has been thwarted by monopoly, the contract may be open for adjustment under § 36. 
 
So far Norwegian courts have only set aside consumer cases on grounds of monopoly,201 
but there are examples of monopoly considerations involving professional parties in other 
Scandinavian courts. In U 1988.1042 DSC the Danish Supreme Court set aside a 
distribution contract with 23 years termination period between professional parties on 
grounds of contractual unreasonableness and imbalance. Furthermore, in U 1986.602 DCA 
the seller of a property reserved the right to work for the buyers as a long-term future 
broker of the property, which prevented the buyers from choosing a broker freely. The 
Court of Appeal decided that the clause was against sound business practice without further 
grounds.202  Both these decisions are based on a combined consideration of monopoly and 
unreasonableness.  
 
                                                 
197 Wilhelmsen: Avtaleloven § 36 og økonomisk effektivitet, TFR-1995-1, p. 103 
198 Wilhelmsen, p. 102 
199 Rt. 1994.833 NSC cf. Wilhelmsen, p. 104 
200 Woxholth, p. 360 
201 Cf. inter alia RG 1991.546 NCA 
202 See also NJA 1989.346 SSC and U 1987.801 DSC, where the Danish Supreme Court set aside a 
contractual provision between two professional parties based on unreasonableness 
 48
In the case of the CoU, it may be argued that the terminal is exercising monopoly and thus 
is exploiting the shipowner’s state of dependency since the vessel will be denied access 
unless the master signs the contract and even if signature is avoided, the contract applies 
regardless. Moreover, the fact that such conditions are customary in the trade203 creates a 
monopoly situation.  
 
Nevertheless, it is debatable whether the monopoly argument alone would hold in court. 
Firstly, the charterer nominates the port and freely enters into a contract of delivery with 
the terminal based on profit considerations. Secondly, due to the regularity of the gas trade 
the shipowner is often aware of what ports will be involved and freely enters into the 
charter party based on profit considerations and may thus choose to avoid charter parties 
involving certain trade areas.204  
 
As regards ii), there are three degrees of fault, namely ordinary negligence, gross 
negligence and intent. There is no sharp borderline between ordinary and gross negligence, 
but the Norwegian Supreme Court has stated that gross negligence must represent ‘a clear 
departure from conduct which is ordinarily justifiable’ and the person must be 
‘substantially more to blame than in the case of ordinary negligence.’205 
 
The traditional view under Norwegian law has been that all liability may be disclaimed, 
except for a person’s own intent or gross negligence.206 This indicates that vicarious 
liability for gross negligence and intent may be disclaimed.207  
 
                                                 
203 Cf. 7.3.1 below 
204 At the introduction of OPA 90 some Norwegian shipowners chose to avoid charter parties involving US 
ports due to the unlimited liability for oil pollution 
205 Rt. 1989.1318 NSC (unofficial translation) 
206 Hagstrøm: Ansvarsfraskrivelse, p. 421 
207 Bull, p. 394, cf. Rt. 1948.370 NSC. Compare Hagstrøm: Ansvarsfraskrivelse, p. 449 for a different 
position 
 49
Case law has a strong tradition for setting aside disclaimers of gross negligence on the basis 
of NL 5-1-2, and it should be noted that when § 36 was introduced the legislators decided 
to keep NL 5-1-2.208  
 
In the area of offshore construction contracts, which similarly to CoU are based on 
principles of risk allocation rather than compensation,209 legal literature leans towards the 
opinion that if the contracts are agreed documents where both parties have influenced the 
agreement, the courts are not likely to set aside disclaimer clauses except where the loss is 
caused by the management’s intent and perhaps also gross negligence,210 since setting 
aside such contracts would adversely affect predictability. Thus, in the case of intent the 
court would most likely set the disclaimers aside.  
t.212  
                                                
 
The position of gross negligence, on the other hand, seems to be more open, and legal 
theory points in different directions.211 The literature seems to favour the opinion that in 
the case of gross negligence, a complete evaluation must be made of the circumstances 
relating to the contract and the position of the parties rather than of traditional concepts like 
gross negligence and inten
 
Another important element is the court’s attitude, and this varies from country to 
country.213 Far-reaching disclaimer and indemnity provisions have been set aside on the 
basis of unreasonableness in other jurisdictions, e.g. in some American states.214 On the 
other hand, as explained in 5.2 above, an English court would not set aside such onerous 
indemnity clauses inter alia due to the fact that they are customary in the trade. This 
general practice test also seems to be important in Norwegian jurisprudence, which states 
 
208 Hagstrøm: Ansvarsfraskrivelse, p. 464 
209 Bull, pp. 346 et seq. 
210 Bull, p. 394 
211 Hagstrøm: Ansvarsfraskrivelse, pp. 462 et seq. and Kaasen, pp. 601 et seq. 
212 Kaasen, p. 609 and Hagstrøm: Ansvarsfraskrivelse, pp. 463 and 473 
213 Bull, p. 393 
214 Bull, p. 393 
 50
that ‘well established and commonly employed contractual conditions’ within the trade will 
normally not be set aside under § 36.215 This points against setting aside the provisions.  
 
On the other hand, an important element of consideration for the court would be whether 
the contracts allocate liability fairly and reasonably.216 The CoU are not agreed documents, 
and this may lead the court to exercise a more restrictive interpretation. If one commercial 
party is inferior in the sense that it has had little opportunity to influence the contents of the 
contract, the court may intervene.217 Other Scandinavian Supreme Courts have adjusted 
contracts in such instances and ‘there is reason to believe that our Supreme Court may go 
the same way’.218 
 
The CoU are imbalanced contracts channelling all risk and unlimited liability to a party 
who may neither influence contents nor refuse to be bound. This creates a situation in 
which the effects of unreasonable contract terms and monopoly are combined. On this 
basis, I believe it is likely that a Norwegian court may adjust or set aside these liability 
provisions.  
7 Insurance cover. Risk allocation between charterer and shipowner 
7.1 Introduction 
Norwegian shipowners normally effect insurance on Norwegian or English terms. The 
following discussion will be based on the Norwegian terms, more specifically the NMIP 
with respect to hull insurance, and Gard Statutes and Rules 2008 (GR) with respect to P&I 
insurance.  
 
                                                 
215 Hagstrøm: Urimelige avtalevilkår (LoR 1994 No. 3/4), p. 156 (unofficial translation) 
216 Bull, p. 393 
217 Woxholth, p. 368 
218 Woxholth, p. 369 (unofficial translation), cf. Hagstrøm: LoR 1994, p. 149 
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Generally speaking, shipowner insurances are divided into asset insurances (mainly hull 
and machinery), income insurances (mainly loss of hire) and liability insurances (mainly 
P&I).  
 
Damage to and loss of the ship is the main area for ordinary hull insurance, whereas the 
chief function of P&I insurance is to protect the shipowner against third party liabilities, 
like personal injury, cargo damage, pollution, wreck removal, measures to avert or 
minimise loss and salvage. Moreover, the hull insurer and P&I insurer share the collision 
liability between them.  
 
In relation to the CoU striking damage is particularly relevant, and due to the explosive 
nature of the cargo, it is possible to imagine rather costly losses in relation to cargo 
operations.  
 
There are three means by which the shipowner may seek to limit such risks: 
 
1) cover under P&I insurance 
2) cover under hull insurance 
3) charter party regulations of liabilities and costs 
 
However, as shown below the risks arising from the CoU are not covered under the 
ordinary insurances, and thus the need for separate cover emerges. Another solution for the 
shipowner is to alleviate the risk by ensuring an acceptable distribution of risks and costs 
between shipowner and charterer in the charter party. 
 
7.2 and 7.3 will examine the cover under P&I insurance and hull insurance, respectively, 
whereas 7.4 will look at risk allocation options under the terms of the charter parties.  
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7.2 Protection and indemnity insurance 
7.2.1 The effect of onerous contract terms 
A significant share of liabilities associated with a port call would normally be covered 
under the P&I insurance.219  
 
However, the P&I insurers have rules which exclude liabilities in excess of what follows 
from ordinary background law, cf. GR 55 ‘Terms of contract’ clause a): 
 
‘The Association shall not cover under a P&I entry liabilities, losses, costs or expenses: 
a) which would not have arisen but for the terms of the contract or indemnity entered 
into by the Member, or by some other person acting on his behalf, unless the terms 
have previously been approved by the Association, or cover for such liabilities, 
losses, costs or expenses has been agreed between the Member and the Association, 
or the Association decides, in its discretion, that the Member should be reimbursed; 
 
Particularly the following aspects of the CoU are not acceptable to the P&I insurers: the 
strict and unlimited liability and the absence of any requirement for causation.220  
 
Gard’s exclusion only applies to liabilities arising under a contract and not liabilities arising 
in tort or statute. Such contracts may be e.g. standard towage contracts and contracts and 
indemnities given to port authorities and harbour pilots.221  
 
Notably, standard cover under P&I insurance is unlimited because the insurers may 
normally invoke the shipowner’s statutory right of limitation.222 Contracts imposing 
unlimited liability are therefore particularly onerous to the P&I insurers.  
                                                 
219 Inter alia GR 27 – 30 and 33 (personal injury and belongings), GR 34 – 35 (cargo liabilities), GR 36 – 37 
(collision and striking), GR 38 (pollution), GR 40 (wreck removal), GR 42 (salvage), GR 43 (towage) and 
GR 46 (measures to avert or minimise loss) 
220 Rygh: Terminalvilkår  
221 Gard Handbook on P&I Insurance (1996), p. 487 
222 Cf. 6.2.5 above 
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 Consequently, as a starting point contracts with these characteristics are not accepted by the 
insurers. Inter alia the Norwegian insurer Gard and the British insurer Britannia have 
refused cover for the CoU in their present form.223  
 
As previously indicated, the oil trade partly solved the P&I insurance problem with side 
letters, whereby the terminals agreed not to rely on the indemnity clauses if the loss was 
resulting from negligence or default on their own part.224 However, side letters do not seem 
to be as widespread in the gas trade. 
 
7.2.2 Contract adjustment 
Where the charterer has been in a position to make requirements, it has proven possible to 
adjust the CoU sufficiently through negotiations to obtain P&I approval. One option is to 
negotiate terminal-specific CoU with the most regular terminals. This is particularly 
relevant where the charterer is involved on the owner side of the terminal, which is not 
uncommon in the trade.  
 
As previously mentioned, the Ras Laffan, Altamira and Hazira Conditions have obtained 
such approval after sufficient adjustment. What distinguishes these contracts from the 
others is primarily the indemnity provisions, which are negligence-based, the presence of 
causation and the limitation of liability.  
 
With respect to the Altamira Conditions, the insurers have pointed out that wreck removal 
should be compulsory under local law and/or by local authorities in order for cover to 
apply. The starting point for P&I cover of wreck removal is cover of all liability imposed 
either by statute or authorities. Still, even if the shipowner has assumed a seemingly more 
far-reaching liability than what follows from background law, the risk of cancellation by 
                                                 
223 Rygh: Terminalvilkår 
224 Cf. 4.2 above 
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the insurer is not high, since the authorities in such a situation are likely to demand removal 
anyway.225 In the case of Altamira, wreck removal will apparently be ordered by the 
authorities in any event, and thus there appears to be no excessive exposure in respect of 
cover.  
 
As regards the Hazira Conditions, the wording is still considered to be onerous by the 
insurers, but is nevertheless acceptable in respect of cover for liabilities arising under the 
indemnity to the limit stipulated in the contract226 for any one incident or occurrence. 
 
These contracts nevertheless prove that it is possible to adjust the provisions to make them 
acceptable to the P&I insurers.  
 
Notably, the Punta Europa Conditions require compulsory P&I cover,227 but is not 
acceptable as of yet. This contract also contains stipulations concerning limitation of 
liability and exception for sole negligence on the part of the terminal, but differs from the 
three approved ones inter alia with respect to lack of negligence-based liability and 
causation.  
 
7.2.3 Separate additional insurance cover 
Where negotiations do not prove successful, the alternative is to sign up for additional 
insurance cover. Both Gard and Britannia provide such additional insurances.  
 
Gard offers a separate insurance to its members for this purpose, the cover of which costs 
approximately USD 17,000 per port call. The limitation amount is USD 100 million and 
the cover lasts for the duration of the call. 
 
                                                 
225 Bull, p. 378 
226 Clause 2.10 
227 Clause 2.4 
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Britannia does not offer any separate insurance cover of its own, but is able to procure 
coverage in the London market. Still, this solution is far more expensive, up to USD 70,000 
per call. However, it may prove to be less practical, since Gard also offers its additional 
insurance to non-members for approximately USD 27,000 per call. 
 
7.3 Hull insurance 
7.3.1 The effect of unusual or prohibited terms 
As already mentioned, in addition to ordinary hull cover the hull insurer also bears a 
substantial portion of the collision liability.  
 
In relation to hull cover, the terminal may cause damage to the vessel, inter alia in relation 
to navigational services by pilots and tugs, mooring and cargo operations or insufficient 
safety procedures. As regards damage caused to the ship by the terminal, the starting point 
is found in NMC § 12-1, which states that the ship is to be restored to the condition it was 
in prior to the occurrence of the damage.  
 
In relation to collision cover, striking is particularly practical with respect to terminal 
damage, as already exemplified by The Polyduke case. 
 
The starting point for collision cover under hull insurance is found in NMIP §13-1 first 
subparagraph:  
 
‘The insurer is liable for liability imposed on the assured for loss which is a result of 
collision or striking by the ship, its accessories, equipment or cargo, or by a tug used 
by the ship.’ 
 
However, hull cover may cease as a consequence of the CoU.  
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NMIP § 4-15 ‘Unusual or prohibited terms of contract’ contains a provision similar to GR 
55: 
 
‘The insurer is in no case liable for liability incurred because the assured or someone on 
his behalf:  
a) has entered into a contract that results in stricter liability than that which follows 
from the ordinary rules of maritime law, unless such terms must be considered 
customary in the trade concerned,  
b) has used or failed to use terms of contract which the insurer in accordance with § 
3-28 has prohibited or described.’ 
 
Based on this, some hull insurers have stated that as long as the P&I insurers do not accept 
these contracts, neither do they.228  
 
However, there is a vital difference between NMIP § 4-15 and GR 55: Whereas the 
decisive point for P&I coverage is whether such liability would not have arisen but for the 
contract terms unless especially approved by the insurer, the decisive point in hull 
insurance is whether ‘such terms must be considered customary in the trade’.  The word 
‘customary’ implies no restrictions on grounds of reasonableness, since when the contracts 
are customary they are most likely known by the parties and may thus be provided for. 
Therefore, if the terms are considered to be customary, the hull insurer would have to issue 
cover even if the P&I insurers refuse. 
 
The effect of such general practice on onerous terms has never been brought before a 
Norwegian court, but as mentioned above, The Polyduke decision contains statements to 
the effect that such indemnity clauses are in fact customary. The defendant shipowner was 
Norwegian, and the insurance was effected on the basis of the NMIP. The court made 
express reference to the wording ‘unless such terms may be considered customary in the 
trade concerned,’ stating that this made the question of insurance cover depend on whether 
                                                 
228 Rygh: Terminalvilkår  
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the onerous clause may be considered to be customary in the tanker trade.229 It is evident 
from the decision that the court considered such conditions customary. In direct response to 
the shipowner’s contention that the clause was especially wide, the judge referred to ‘the 
background of similar conditions in force at other oil terminals in many parts of the 
world’.230 The court also stated that there is a general practice in the tanker trade of masters 
being required to sign such documents. It was held that the clause in question ‘‘however 
harsh and one-sided [was] in line with many similar provisions’231 and in fact ‘fairly 
common’.232  
 
The statements concerning general practice in the oil trade also have relevance for the gas 
trade, since it is often the same petroleum companies which own the terminals. Although 
CoU are mainly employed by export ports, they are quite commonly used by these 
terminals. It is thus doubtful whether the hull insurers’ rejection of coverage would be 
upheld by court.  
 
However, the hull insurer may also try to invoke NMIP § 3-28, which gives the insurer the 
right to exclude certain contract terms either from contracts in general or with respect to a 
specific port or trade. According to § 4-15 (b), see above, the general practice test does not 
apply to such terms prohibited by the insurer. Subsequently, it is possible for the insurer 
first to exclude onerous terms in accordance with § 3-28, and thereafter refuse insurance 
under § 4-15 (b).  
 
7.3.2 The effect of recourse waiver 
With respect to recourse claims, NMIP § 5-14 ‘Waiver of claims’ opens for reduced 
liability for the insurer if the assured has waived its rights towards third parties, e.g. in 
connection with indemnification of the terminal: 
                                                 
229 p. 214 
230 p. 216 
231 p. 216 
232 p. 216 
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 ‘The insurer’s liability shall be reduced by an amount equal to that which he is 
prevented from collecting because the assured has waived his right to claim damages 
from a third party, unless the waiver may be considered customary in the trade in 
question, or was given in accordance with directions issued by the insurer on the 
basis of § 3-28.’ 
 
Handbook in hull insurance233 discusses recourse in relation to tug contracts:  
 
‘However, contracts for towage often contain more far-reaching liability provisions, 
whereby the towed ship will be held liable for damage suffered by the tug itself, 
whether or not the tug has collided with the tow or with an oncoming ship and 
regardless of whether or not the damage is a result of the tug’s own negligence. Such 
contracts for towage may also prevent recourse actions from the insured ship against 
the tug in situations where the insured ship has incurred liability towards an 
oncoming ship. As long as such contract terms must be “considered customary in the 
trade concerned”, cf. NMIP § 4-15 letter (a), or are not “prohibited” by the insurer 
according to NMIP § 3-28, cf. NMIP § 4-15 letter (b), the resulting liability for the 
insured ship will be fully recognised by the hull insurer and covered by him in his 
capacity as liability insurer under NMIP § 13-1.’ 
 
If we apply this text by analogy to terminal conditions, we are left with the following 
situation: While recourse from the terminal is highly unlikely in practice, once again the 
issue must be decided on whether the waiver can be considered customary in the trade or 
has been prohibited by the insurer. Reference is thus made to the discussion above.  
 
                                                 
233 Wilhelmsen/Bull, p. 288 
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7.4 Charter party cover 
7.4.1 Cover under the ordinary charter party terms 
In time chartering the operational costs are divided between shipowner and charterer. The 
shipowner undertakes to pay for the vessel’s equipment, maintenance and crew, whereas 
the charterer covers costs related to voyage orders, i.e. bunkers and expenses associated 
with the port call.234 Insurance costs normally fall on the shipowner under a time charter 
party235 since insurance is often tied to the duty to repair and maintain.236  
 
However, since the need for separate additional insurance cover is directly related to the 
port call and thus originates from the voyage orders, it is not automatically clear that the 
shipowner should assume these costs, and the same line of reasoning applies to possible 
uninsured liabilities arising from the CoU.  
 
On the other hand, these are not direct expenses but potential indirect costs of additional 
insurance or alternatively an increased risk for the shipowner, and may thus not necessarily 
be transferred to the charterer without special regulation.237 The shipowner can therefore 
not rely on automatic charter cover of increased liabilities and costs imposed by the 
terminal unless this has been specifically agreed from the outset.238  
 
However, it has proven possible for some shipowners to obtain reimbursement by the 
charterer for such separate insurances under ordinary charter party terms without any prior 
agreement or specific regulation of the issue. Moreover, under some charter parties 
insurance costs are covered by the charterer on a so-called ‘costs pass through’ basis, 
which in this context implies that the charterer is directly liable for incurred costs instead of 
reimbursing the shipowner. Such a system gives the charterer increased influence on 
expenditure.  
                                                 
234 Falkanger/Bull/Brautaset, p. 408 
235 Michelet: Håndbok i tidsbefraktning (1997), § 6.23. p. 144, cf. ShellLNGTime 1 Clause 40 (b) – (c)  
236 Falkanger/Bull/Brautaset, p. 435 
237 Rygh: Terminalvilkår 
238 Rygh: Terminalvilkår 
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 Nevertheless, since the shipowner may not automatically rely on ordinary charter party 
cover of such costs, Nordisk recommends implementing a special provision to ensure such 
cover. Furthermore, in addition to channelling extraordinary insurances expenses to the 
charterer, such a charter party provision should also contain an indemnification clause 
whereby the charterer assumes liability for potential uninsured losses or claims arising 
from the CoU.  
 
7.4.2 Suggested charter party provision 
To accommodate the above needs, Nordisk has drawn up the following suggested charter 
party provision.  
 
The first part of the provision regulates cover of additional insurances:  
 
‘For the purpose of this clause, the words “Conditions of Use” shall mean any kind 
of agreement or terms that the Owners and/or the Vessel must enter into or accept 
with the operators of any port or terminal in order to be allowed access to or use of 
such port or terminal, whether or not such agreement or terms are entitled 
“Conditions of Use”.  
 
If the context of such Conditions of Use are not acceptable to the Vessel’s P&I club, 
the Owners shall be entitled to take out separate or additional insurance cover, and 
any additional premiums and/or calls and/or extra deductibles required by the 
Vessel’s underwriters due to the Conditions of Use, shall be for the Charterers’ 
account.’ 
 
The second part of the provision contains an indemnification of the shipowner whereby the 
charterer assumes liability for potential uninsured losses or claims arising from the CoU 
and also stipulates that the vessel shall remain on hire, unless the situation is caused by the 
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sole negligence of shipowner or crew. The latter may become relevant for instance if the 
vessel is detained. 
 
‘Notwithstanding anything else contained in this Charter Party, and notwithstanding 
whether or not additional insurance cover has been taken out in accordance with the 
above provision, all liability, delay, costs or expenses whatsoever arising out of or 
related to Conditions of Use shall be for the Charterers’ account and the Vessel shall 
always remain on hire, unless such liability, delay, costs or expenses result solely 
from the negligence of the Owners, Master or crew. The Charterers assume liability 
for and shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless the Owners against any loss 
and/or damage whatsoever (including consequential loss and/or damage) and all 
other claims of whatsoever nature, including but not limited to legal costs, arising 
from the Conditions of Use.’ 
8 Concluding remarks 
The gas trade is dominated by large international petroleum companies with strong 
negotiating powers. Whereas the Conditions of Use are typically issued by export 
terminals, the charterers are typically involved on the import side. Amidst these two power 
players the shipowners have limited influence. 
 
This discussion of the CoU has shown that the contracts are built on a principle of 
unilateral liability. The contractual provisions are characterised by unlimited and strict, or 
far-reaching, liability for the shipowner in the form of comprehensive indemnity and 
disclaimer clauses which together produce the effect that the shipowner becomes liable for 
all damage to its own and the terminal’s interests as well as third party interests.  
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The liability provisions depart from ordinary legal principles inter alia with respect to the 
unlimited and strict liability for the shipowner, the lack of requirement for causation and 
the terminal’s disclaiming of all fault on the part of itself and its servants.  
 
P&I insurers do not cover liabilities in excess of what is imposed by ordinary background 
law. The cover under hull insurance is more uncertain, since the decisive point for this 
insurance is whether such terms may be considered customary in the trade.  
 
Moreover, how these risks should be allocated between shipowner and charterer is not 
automatically clear, with the result that the charterer may refuse to cover expenses related 
to the CoU. 
 
Nevertheless, shipowners and charterers have a united interest in seeking to reduce this risk 
exposure, and so far two solutions have been successful to a certain extent:  
 
1) adjustment of the CoU through negotiations 
2) separate P&I insurance cover 
 
Where the charterers have been in a position to make requirements, they have successfully 
negotiated sufficient adjustments of some CoU to obtain P&I approval. This proves that it 
is possible to negotiate balanced solutions. What distinguishes the approved contracts from 
the others is primarily the negligence-based liability on the part of the shipowner, the 
existence of causation and the limitation of liability.  
 
Moreover, separate P&I insurances with an additional premium and limited liability cover 
are now available in the market.   
 
Nevertheless, the shipowner is still exposed to increased risk, inter alia if the hull insurer 
rejects cover, or if P&I liabilities exceed the limited cover under the additional insurance. 
Such risks should, if possible, be provided for in the charter party.  
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Annex: Examined Conditions of Use 
The following contracts, in alphabetical order, have been analysed in this thesis: 
 
Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (Annex 1) 
Altamira, Mexico (Annex 2) 
Bonny, Nigeria (Annex 3) 
Braefoot Bay, United Kingdom (Annex 4) 
Escravos, Nigeria (Annex 5) 
Hazira, India (Annex 6) 
Kharg Island, Iran (Annex 7) 
Kuwait, Kuwait (Annex 8) 
Port Rashid, Dubai (Annex 9) 
Punta Europa, Equatorial Guinea (Annex 10) 
Qalhat, Oman (Annex 11) 
Ras Laffan, Qatar (Annex 12) 
Sharjah, United Arab Emirates (Annex 13) 
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1. PASSAGE PLAN AGREEMENT 
Pilot passage/mooring/unmooring plan agreement between Master and Pilot. Following 
discussed in details using Pilot Passage Card and agreed by the Master for the safe passage:  
 
• Tides, currents, minimum depths in Channel and at Berth, Minimum Under keel 
clearance in Channel and at berth. 
• Master confirms all 1) Navigation equipment 2) Main Engines and Machinery 3) 
Steering gear 4) Mooring equipment are tested and must be tested and in working 
condition before any manoeuvring to and from the berth. 
• Master must notify the pilot any special conditions or peculiarities such as defective 
equipment, lines or gears, which might impose special hazards in connection with 
handling mooring or discharging of cargo. 
• Pilot will refuse to berth any vessel with unsatisfactory equipment. Full main engine 
power must be available for manoeuvring ahead and astern.  
• All tanks openings, ullage ports and sighting ports must be closed before berthing/un 
berthing commences. 
• Both anchor stoppers must be in place to prevent accidental release of anchors while 
transiting the channel between buoys, but they should be ready for immediate 
deployment. 
• Anchors may be required to use in emergency ONLY. 
• Tugs to be made fast by Tug’s lines decided by Pilot. Normally three tugs are to be 
made fast i.e.(details of making fast the tugs to be included) 
• If required a standby tug will be used for turning around at turning basin / off the 
berth. 
• No mixed moorings allowed. 
• Mooring pattern will be as follows: First line to go will be springs, followed by breast 
lines and head / stern lines.  All lines will be passed by heaving line and messenger 
line. 
• Pilot and the Master both have discussed together and satisfied and agreed themselves 
as to berthing, un berthing  and passage plans for the vessel. 
 
 
 
 
MASTER  sign __________________________________   
 
 
 
 
PILOT  sign ____________________________________ 
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2. CONDITIONS OF USE HAZIRA (SURAT) PORT  
(Applicable for LNG vessels only) 
 
 
All facilities and assistance of any kind whatsoever provided by the Company or the 
Company Representatives to LNG vessels visiting the Port for any purpose whatsoever are 
subject to the following conditions of use (“Conditions”). These Conditions are applicable 
regardless of whether or not any or all charges / costs are paid or are actually or impliedly due 
from or on account of any visiting vessels, whether of Indian or foreign flag. Without 
prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the following shall be deemed to have been 
specifically accepted by any vessel visiting the Port regardless of whether such acceptance is 
specific, in writing or otherwise. 
 
For the purpose of these Conditions the following definitions shall apply: 
 
“Affiliate” means either or both of Hazira LNG Private Limited and Hazira Gas Private 
Limited, which are companies incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 having their 
registered office at 101-103, “Abhijeet-II”, Mithakhali Circle, Ahmedabad 380 006, Gujarat, 
India. 
 
“Company” means the Hazira Port Private Limited a company incorporated under the 
Companies Act, 1956 having its registered office at 101-103, “Abhijeet-II”, Mithakhali 
Circle, Ahmedabad 380 006, Gujarat, India. 
 
“Company Representative” means (collectively and severally) the Affiliate or any of its or its 
Affiliates employees, contractors, servants, consultants, advisors, agents or representatives in 
whatever capacity they may be acting. 
 
“Port” means the Hazira (Surat) Port notified as a minor port under the Indian Ports Act, 
1908. 
 
“Port Facilities” means all the infrastructure, equipment and installation at the Port which 
includes, but is not limited to, channels, channel markings, buoys, jetties, berths lines, 
gangways and bunkering facilities or the unloading facilities at the regasification terminal of 
the Hazira LNG Private Limited.   
 
“Port Services” means any service rendered by the Company or Company Representative 
which includes, but is not limited to, mooring or unmooring or raising or lowering of the 
loading lines or loading or discharging or otherwise, but excluding towage services which are 
governed by Clause 3 of the Condition of Use Book. 
 
 
2.1 The Master of a vessel shall under all circumstances remain responsible on behalf of 
the Owners for the safety and proper navigation of the vessel at the Port and shall at all times 
comply with all applicable law, applicable port regulations and directions and instructions 
issued by the Company and Company Representatives from time to time to the Master.  
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2.2 Whilst the Company has undertaken all reasonable care, skill and diligence to ensure 
that Port Services are safe, the Company does not represent or warrant that the Port Services 
are safe or suitable for any vessel. Any vessel using Port Services at the Port shall do so at its 
sole and exclusive risk. The Company or Company Representative shall not be responsible 
for any loss or damage to the vessel, actual or consequential, which is in any manner related 
to the use of the Port Services regardless of any act, omission, fault or neglect of the 
Company or the Company Representative, including pilot’s neglect, error or mistake. This 
clause 2.2 shall apply irrespective of whether or not the vessel is within the notified limits of 
the Port, as such port limits are more particularly identified in the Hazira Port Information 
Book. 
  
 
2.3 Whilst the Company has undertaken all reasonable care and diligence to ensure that 
the Port and Port Facilities are safe, the Company or the Company Representative does not 
represent or warrant that the Port or the Port Facilities are safe or suitable for any vessel. Any 
vessel using the Port or the Port Facilities shall use the Port and the Port Facilities at its sole 
and exclusive risk. The Company or the Company Representative shall not be responsible for 
any loss or damage to the vessel, actual or consequential, which is in any manner related to 
the use of the Port and the Port Facilities regardless of any act, omission, fault, neglect, error 
or mistake of the Company or the Company Representatives.  
 
 
2.4 All vessels visiting the Port must themselves ensure whether or not they are capable of 
operating within the physical limitations of the Port’s dimensions, unloading arm envelopes 
and mooring equipment, as such physical limitations, port dimensions etc are more 
particularly identified in the Hazira Port Information Book. 
 
 
2.5 Neither the Company nor the Company Representatives shall be responsible for any 
loss, damage, injury or delay from whatsoever cause arising out of any assistance, advice or 
instruction whatsoever given / tendered, in writing or otherwise, in respect of any vessel.  In 
all circumstances the Master and/or the Owners shall remain solely responsible for the safety 
and proper navigation of such vessel. 
 
 
2.6 Neither the Company nor the Company Representatives shall in any event be 
responsible for the acts or defaults of any of their employees or servants or agents or of any 
Government Authority for any loss, damage, injury or delay howsoever caused or arising that 
may occur to the vessel or her cargo or equipment or personal injury to the Master or any 
member of her crew whether on board or otherwise whilst visiting the Port. 
 
 
2.7 Neither the Company nor the Company Representatives shall in any event be 
responsible or liable for the consequences of war, riots, civil commotions, acts of terrorism or 
sabotage, strikes, lockouts, disputes, stoppages or labour disturbances (whether the Company 
or the Company Representatives or their employees are a party thereto or not) or anything 
done in contemplation or furtherance thereof or delays of any description, howsoever caused 
or arising, including by the negligence of the Company or the Company Representatives. 
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2.8 The vessel and Owner shall, jointly and severally, in all circumstances hold harmless 
and indemnify the Company against all losses, claims, damages, costs and expenses the 
Company may incur or has incurred arising from: 
 
(a) any loss suffered by the Company arising out of any damage to the Port or Port 
Facilities which involves the fault, wholly or partially of the Master or the crew of the vessel, 
including negligent navigation; 
 
(b) any loss suffered by the Company arising out of death or injury to the personnel which 
involves the fault, wholly or partially of the Master or the crew of the vessel, including 
negligent navigation; 
 
(c) any loss suffered by third parties, including by Company Representatives, arising out 
of damage to their property which involves the fault, wholly or partially of the Master or the 
crew of the vessel, including negligent navigation; 
 
(d) any loss suffered by third parties, including by Company Representatives, arising out 
of death or injury to their personnel which involves the fault, wholly or partially of the Master 
or the crew of the vessel, including negligent navigation; 
 
(e) any loss suffered by the vessel while at the Port, including any consequential losses 
and damages, regardless of any act, omission, fault or neglect on part of the Company or 
Company Representatives. 
 
(f) any loss suffered due to death or personal injury to the Master, officers or crew of the 
vessel while at the Port, including any consequential losses and damages, regardless of any 
act, omission, fault or neglect on part of the Company or Company Representatives. 
 
 
2.9 If the vessel is or is likely to become an obstruction threat or danger to navigation, 
operations, safety, health, environment or security of the Port (“a hazard”) the Master and the 
Owners shall, if required by the Company take immediate action to clear, remove or rectify 
the hazard in such a manner as the Company may direct. Alternatively, the Company may 
take such steps itself, as it deems fit and proper in its sole discretion, and the Owner shall be 
responsible for and indemnify the Company against all costs and expenses associated 
therewith. 
 
 
2.10 The aggregate liability of the vessel, Master and Owners to the Company under these 
Conditions in respect of all claims arising from any one accident or occurrence shall be 
limited to US$ 150,000,000 and, to the fullest extent permissible by law, the Owners and their 
insurers hereby waive any rights they may otherwise have under applicable law or any 
applicable Convention to limit their liability at any lower limit.  
 
 
2.11 Nothing contained in these conditions shall limit, prejudice or preclude in any way 
any legal rights, which the Company or the Company Representative may have against the 
Owner or Master of the vessel. The Owner or Master of the vessel, to the fullest extent 
permissible by law, undertake not to take or cause to be taken any proceedings against the 
Company or the Company Representative or their personnel, in respect of any negligence or 
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breach of duty or other wrongful act on their part, but for this present provision, it would be 
competent for the Owner or the Master so to do. 
 
 
2.12 The Master of the vessel represents that he is authorized to sign these Conditions and 
makes this agreement for and on behalf of the Owners of the vessel.  
 
 
2.13 These Conditions shall be construed in accordance with the laws of India and if so 
required by the Company, the vessel and her Owners shall submit to the jurisdiction of the 
Indian Courts. 
 
I, the undersigned, being the Master of;  
 
M.T./ S.S. _________________________________  Flag _______________________  
 
 
Built _____________________________________   
 
 
Owned / Operated by ________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Do hereby acknowledge receipt of the “Hazira Port Information Book” on arrival at the 
anchorage of the Port and on behalf of the and her Owners, operators and charterers accept 
the “Conditions of Use” of installations and services at Hazira (Surat) Port” detailed above.  I 
confirm having received the port user’s information book and confirm that its contents are 
acceptable and binding and that the crew have also read it and are familiar with the same for 
safe operations at all times. 
 
 
 
Master’s Name____________________________  
 
 
Master’s Signature______________________________ 
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3. CONDITIONS OF USE OF TUG SERVICES 
 
THE TUG SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE HAZIRA PORT PRIVATE LIMITED TO 
THE LNG CARRIER ARE COVERED UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS 
FOR TOWAGE AND OTHER SERVICES.  
 
3.1     (a) The agreement between the Company and the Hirer is and shall at all times be subject to 
and include each and all of the conditions hereinafter set out. 
(b)    for the purposes of these conditions: 
(i.) “towing” is any operation in connection with the holding, pushing, pulling, moving, 
escorting or guiding of or standing by the Hirer’s vessel, and the expressions “to tow”, 
“being towed” and “towage” shall be defined likewise. 
(ii.)“vessel” shall include any vessel, craft or object of whatsoever nature (whether or not 
coming within the usual meaning of the word “vessel”) which the Company through the 
Tugowner agrees to tow or to which the Company agrees at the request, express or 
implied, of the Hirer, to render any service of whatsoever nature other than towing. 
(iii.)“tender” shall include any vessel, craft or object of whatsoever nature which is not a 
tug but which is provided by the Company for the performance of any towage or other 
service. 
(iv.)The expression “whilst towing” shall cover the period commencing when the tug or 
tender is in a position to receive orders direct from the Hirer’s vessel to commence 
holding, pushing, pulling, moving, escorting, guiding or standing by the vessel to pick 
up ropes, wires or lines, or when the towing line has been passed to or by the tug or 
tender, whichever is sooner, and ending when the final orders from the Hirer’s vessel to 
cease holding, pushing, pulling, moving, escorting, guiding or standing by the vessel or 
to cast off ropes, wires or lines has been carried out, or the towing line has been finally 
slipped, whichever is the later, and the tug or tender is safely clear of the vessel.  
(v.)Any service of whatsoever nature to be performed by the Company other than towing 
shall be deemed to cover the period commencing when the tug or tender is placed 
physically at the disposal of the Hirer at the place designated by the position to receive 
and forthwith carry out orders to come alongside and shall continue until the 
employment for which the tug or tender has been engaged is ended.  If the service is to 
be ended at or off a vessel the period of service shall end when the tug or tender is 
safely clear of the vessel or, if it is to be ended elsewhere, then when any persons or 
property of whatsoever description have been landed or discharged from the tug or 
tender and/or the service for which the tug or tender has been required is ended 
(vi.)The word “tug” shall include “tugs”, the word “tender” shall include “tenders”, the 
word “vessel” shall include “vessels” the word “Tugowner” shall include 
“Tugowners”,and the word “Hirer” shall include “Hirers”. 
(vii.) The expression “tugowner” shall include and persons or body who is either the  owner 
of  the tug or tender.. 
(viii.) The expression “Hirer” means the owner or charterer of the vessel 
3.2  If at the time of making this agreement or of performing the towage or of rendering any service 
other than towing at the request, express or implied, of the Hirer, the Hirer is not the owner of the 
vessel referred to herein as “the Hirer’s vessel”, the Hirer expressly represents that he is 
authorised to make and does make this agreement for and on behalf of the owner of the said vessel 
subject to each and all of these conditions and agrees that both the Hirer and the Owner are bound 
jointly and severally by these conditions. 
3.3 Whilst towing or whilst at the request, express or implied, of the Hirer, rendering any service other 
than towing, the master and crew of the tug or tender shall be deemed to be the servants of the 
Hirer and under the control of the Hirer and/or his servants and/or his agents, and anyone on board 
the Hirer’s vessel who may be employed and/or paid by the the Company or the Tugowner shall 
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likewise be deemed to be the servant of the Hirer and the Hirer shall accordingly be vicariously 
liable for any act or omission by any such person so deemed to be the servant of the Hirer.  
3.4 Whilst towing, or whilst at the request, either express or implied, of the Hirer rendering any 
service of whatsoever nature other than towing:- 
(a)    The  Company or the Tugowner shall not (except as provided in Clause 3(c) and (e) hereof) 
be responsible for or be liable for: 
(i) Damage of any description done by or to the tug or tender; or done by or to the 
Hirer’s vessel or done by or to any cargo or other thing on board or being loaded 
on board or intended to be loaded on board the Hirer’s vessel or the tug or tender 
or to or by any other object or property 
                  or 
(ii) Loss of the tug or tender or the Hirer’s vessel or any cargo or other thing on board 
or being loaded on board or intended to be loaded on board the Hirer’s vessel or 
the tug or tender or any other object or property; 
                 or 
(iii) Any claim by a person not a party to this agreement for loss or damage of any 
description whatsoever; 
arising from any cause whatsoever, including (without prejudice to the generality of the 
foregoing) negligence at any time of the Company or the Tugowner their servants or 
agents, unseaworthiness, unfitness or breakdown of the tug or tender, its machinery, 
boilers, towing gear, equipment, lines, ropes or wires, lack of fuel, stores, speed or 
otherwise and 
(b) The Hirer shall (except as provided in Clause 43(c) and (e) be responsible for, pay for and 
indemnify the Company and the Tugowner against and in respect of any loss or damage and 
any claims of whatsoever nature or howsoever arising or caused, whether covered by the 
provisions of Clause 3(a) hereof or not, suffered by or made against the Company or the 
Tugowner and which shall include, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, any 
loss or damage to the tug or tender or any property of the Company or the Tugowner even if 
the same arises from or is caused by the negligence of the Company, the Tugowner or their  
servants or agents. 
 
(c) The provisions of Clause 3.4(a) and 3.4(b) hereof shall not be applicable in respect of any 
claims which arise in any of the following circumstances:- 
(i) All claims which the Hirer shall prove to have resulted directly and solely from the 
personal failure of the Company or the Tugowner to exercise reasonable care to make the 
tug or tender seaworthy for navigation at the commencement of the towing or other service.  
For the purpose of this Clause the Company’s or Tugowner’s personal responsibility for 
exercising reasonable care shall be construed as relating only to the person or persons 
having the ultimate control and chief management of the Company’s or Tugowner’s 
business and to any servant  (excluding the officers and crew of any tug or tender) to whom 
the Company or the Tugowner has specifically delegated the particular duty of exercising 
reasonable care and shall not include any other servant of the Company or the  Tugowner or 
any agent or independent contractor employed by the Company or the Tugowner. 
(ii)All claims which arise when the tug or tender, although towing or rendering some service 
other than towing, is not in a position of proximity or risk to or from the Hirer’s vessel or 
any other craft attending the Hirer’s vessel and is detached from and safely clear of any 
ropes, lines, wire cables or moorings associated with the Hirer’s vessel.  Provided always 
that, notwithstanding the foregoing, the provisions of Clause 3(a) and 3(b) shall be fully 
applicable in respect of all claims which arise at any time when the tug or tender is at the 
request, whether express or implied, of the Hirer, his servants or his agents, carrying persons 
or property of whatsoever description (in addition to the Officers and Crew and usual 
equipment of the tug or tender) and which are wholly or partly caused by or arise out of the 
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presence on board of such persons or property or which arise at anytime when the tug or 
tender is proceeding to or from the Hirer’s vessel in hazardous conditions or circumstances. 
(d)   Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, neither the Company nor the Tugowner 
shall under no circumstances whatsoever be responsible for or be liable for any loss or 
damage caused by or contributed to arising out of any delay or detention of the Hirer’s vessel 
or of the cargo on board or being loaded on board or intended to be loaded on board the 
Hirer’s vessel or of any other object or property or of any person, or any consequence 
thereof, whether or not the same shall be caused or arise whilst towing or whilst at the 
request, either express or implied, of the Hirer rendering any service of whatsoever nature 
other than towing or at any other time whether before during or after the making of this 
agreement. 
(e)   Notwithstanding anything contained in Clauses 3(a) and (b) hereof the liability of the 
Company or the Tugowner for death or personal injury resulting from negligence is not 
excluded or restricted thereby. 
3.5  Nothing contained in these conditions shall limit, prejudice or preclude in any way any legal 
rights which the Company or the Tugowner may have against the Hirer including, but not limited 
to, any rights which the Company or the Tugowner or his servants or agents may have to claim 
salvage remuneration or special compensation for any extraordinary services rendered to vessels 
or anything aboard vessels by any tug or tender.  Furthermore, nothing contained in these 
conditions shall limit, prejudice, or preclude in any way any right, which the Company or the 
Tugowner may have to limit his liability. 
3.6  The Company or the Tugowner will not in any event be responsible or liable for the consequences 
of war, riots, civil commotions, acts of terrorism or sabotage, strikes, lockouts, disputes, stoppages 
or labour disturbances (whether he be a party thereto or not) or anything done in contemplation or 
furtherance thereof or delays of any description, howsoever caused or arising, including by the 
negligence of the Company or the Tugowner for the benefit of his servants or agents. 
3.7  The Hirer of the tug or tender engaged subject to these conditions undertakes not to take or cause 
to be taken any proceedings against any servant or agent of the Company or the Tugowner , in 
respect of any negligence or breach of duty or other wrongful act on the part of such servant or 
agent which, but for this present provision, it would be competent for the Hirer so to do and the 
owners of such tug or tender shall hold this undertaking for the benefit of their servants and 
agents. 
3.8 The agreement in relation to towage shall be governed under Indian Law. 
 
 
 
 
 
Master  Name: ___________________  
 
Signature: _______________________  
 
 
Pilot Name: ___________________  
 
Signature_____________________ 
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